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Abstract
My dissertation analyzes U.S. consumers’ use of money and credit as means of payment
and, in the case of credit cards, as a device that aids inter-temporal consumption smooth-
ing. Money demand has received little attention in the literature lately, especially when
compared to earlier decades, but our work with Scott Schuh shows that the proliferation
of the ways consumers can make payments has important implications for the demand for
various liquid assets. Therefore, accurate estimates of the demand for liquid asset needs to
take payment instrument adoption and use into account. Data collected by the Consumer
Payments Research Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston provides a good starting
point for such analysis, as shown in the first two chapters of the dissertation.
The final chapter analyzes another aspect of consumer credit, namely, it’s usefulness in
smoothing income fluctuations. This model is interesting because for agents in the model to
use credit for consumption smoothing it has to be defaultable. The default option, however,
induces a moral hazard problem: The additional insurance from bankruptcy protection leads
to lower precautionary saving than in a similar model with no credit (or, equivalently, with
non-defaultable credit). In general equilibrium, however, this decrease in savings leads to
a lower aggregate capital stock and hence wages. In the calibration, the introduction of
unsecured consumer credit results in a significant welfare loss in the economy as a whole.
The first chapter, joint with Scott Schuh, estimates U.S. consumers’ demand for cash
using a new panel micro data for 2008–2010, employing econometric methodology similar
to that in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000); Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002); and
Lippi and Secchi (2009). We extend the Baumol (1952)—Tobin (1956) model to allow for
credit card payments and revolving debt, as in Sastry (1970). With interest rates near zero,
cash demand by consumers using credit cards for convenience (without revolving debt) has
the same small, negative, interest elasticity as estimated in earlier periods and with broader
money measures. However, cash demand by consumers using credit cards to borrow (with
revolving debt) is interest inelastic. These findings have implications for the welfare cost
of inflation because the nontrivial share of consumers who revolve credit card debt are less
likely to switch from cash to credit. Our estimation also shows that accounting for the
heterogeneous transactions costs that consumers face, when getting cash from bank and
nonbank sources, is essential to identify cash demand properly.
The second chapter, also joint with Scott Schuh, looks at consumers’ demand for transac-
tions balances at an even more granular level than the first chapter. Using the 2012 Diary
of Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC), we first document the substantial changes in pay-
ment instrument use of U.S. households compared to the results in Klee (2008) (which were
based on data from 2001): Checks have virtually disappeared from purchase transactions,
while still play a role in bill payments. Cash, on the other hand, still plays a large role for
low-value transactions. Then we proceed to jointly analyze payment instrument use and
consumers’ demand for liquid assets. Results indicate that payment instrument choice is
an integral part of consumers’ cash management practices and hence cash demand; there-
fore, contrary to simple Baumol (1952)—Tobin (1956) models, they should be analyzed
together.
The final chapter in the dissertation is admittedly different from the previous two. While
credit cards, more precisely unsecured consumer credit, is still the object of the analysis;
the main focus is not on its role in settling transactions but on its role in inter-temporal con-
sumption smoothing. In particular, the unsecured nature of credit card loans enable house-
holds to smooth consumption even in the face of large income disruptions, since bankruptcy
protection provides them a way out of the mounting debt burden if their income stream de-
teriorates for too long. In fact, consumer defaults in the United States are counter-cyclical,
suggesting that households use bankruptcy protection as a way to smooth consumption
in the face of aggregate shocks. This chapter analyses the value of the option to default
in a computable general equilibrium model similar to Krusell and Smith (1998). Model
simulations show that unsecured borrowing helps the poorest consumers maintain a more
stable consumption path when compared to an economy without bankruptcy and hence
borrowing. For the economy as a whole, this utility gain, however, is offset by the effects of
a declining average wage, resulting from a smaller aggregate capital stock, as consumers are
less inclined to self-insure against income shocks in the presence of the option to default.
This hits asset-poor households in the middle of the wealth distribution.
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Chapter 1
U.S. Consumer Demand for Cash in the
Era of Low Interest Rates and Electronic
Payments
1.1 Introduction
Reports of the demise of cash as a means of payment in the U.S. economy may be premature.
The new Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC) indicates that it still accounts for
more than one in four payments made by consumers. However, the demand for cash by U.S.
consumers has arguably declined during the past quarter century, as shown in Table 1.1.
The average stock of cash carried for transactions fell more than 30 percent in real terms
since the mid-1980s (from $112 to $79) and the typical amount of a cash withdrawal fell
1
nearly 50 percent (from $261 to $132). So, cash is not “dead”—at least not yet.1
New evidence on cash management comes at a potentially enlightening time to re-evaluate
money demand. During the financial crisis of 2007–2009, short-term interest rates dropped
to near zero, so the opportunity cost of holding money in currency, rather than in interest-
bearing deposit accounts, essentially vanished. At the same time, consumer cash with-
drawals increased and cash payments by consumers increased, according to Foster et al.
(2011), even as the economy recovered. Furthermore, during the quarter century leading
up to this unique period, the U.S. payment system experienced a transformation from paper
instruments (cash and checks) to a wide range of payment cards and other electronic means
of authorizing, clearing, and settling payments. Some technological developments affected
the transactions costs of acquiring and managing cash as well.
This paper estimates consumer demand for cash in an era of low interest and electronic
payments.2 Our econometric methodology follows recent attempts to estimate various forms
of money demand using cross-sectional micro data for U.S. households, as in Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin (2000), and time-series panel micro data for Italian households, as in
Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002) and especially Lippi and Secchi (2009), to which our
study is closest. Naturally, our econometric specification is shaped by data availability, but
the model is quite similar to these recent studies. Our contribution meets the challenge of
(Ireland, 2009, page 1049):
1Evans et al. (2013) draws a similar conclusion.
2Unfortunately, the scope of investigation is limited to cash rather than M1 because analogous data on
consumer deposit accounts are not available at this time.
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Finding additional sources of information about the limiting behavior of money
demand as interest rates approach zero, whether from time series data from
other economies or from cross-sectional data as suggested by Casey B. Mulligan
and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2000), remains a critical task for sharpening existing
estimates of the welfare cost of modest rates of inflation.
Our econometric model also extends the literature in two ways. First, we estimate a
version of the Baumol (1952)–Tobin (1956) (BT henceforth) model, due to Sastry (1970),
that enables consumers to shift their spending from cash to credit. We separately identify
the interest elasticity of cash demand for credit card “convenience users” (those who pay
their credit bill in full each month) and credit card “revolvers” (consumers who carry some
credit card debt across months). Revolving debt in the United States has surged in impor-
tance since the mid-1980s, reaching $1 trillion (a tenfold nominal increase) and 9 percent
of disposable income (a threefold increase) by the time of the financial crisis.3 Second, our
econometric model controls for payment instrument adoption and cash management prac-
tices (withdrawals) that reflect technological changes and the transformation from paper to
electronic means of payment.
One key result is that the interest elasticity of cash demand depends directly on whether
consumers carry revolving debt, and hence on the interest rate for credit card debt. Con-
venience users of credit cards exhibit essentially the same small, negative interest elasticity
in 2008–2010 as were estimated in earlier periods and with broader money measures (see,
3On this topic see, for example, Iacoviello (2008) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2010).
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1984/86 2008-10
Average Average Change
Value of cash in pocket, purse or wallet
Average amount ($) 112 79 -33
(share of monthly median income (%)) (2.9) (1.9) (1.0)
Number of withdrawals per month (#) 4.3 5.6 1.3
Usual amount per withdrawal ($) 261 132 -129
Value of cash withdrawals
estimated monthly amount∗ ($) 817 488 -329
(share of monthly median income (%)) (21.0) (12.0) (-9.0)
Number of cash payments
per month (#) na 19.2 na
share in number of all transactions (%) na 27.0 na
All numbers are 2010 dollar values unless noted otherwise.
Sources: SCTAU for 1984-86, SCPC for 2008-10, median incomes from Census Bureau.
∗ Derived from typical number of withdrawals and typical amount of withdrawal at the
level of individual respondents. May not equal actual total withdrawals.
Table 1.1: U.S. consumers’ cash management
for example, Ireland (2009)). In contrast, cash demand by credit card revolvers is interest
inelastic. The underlying intuition of this result is simple. Convenience users can easily
shift their cash spending to credit to reduce forgone interest income on cash holdings, by
taking advantage of the interest-free grace period. Such substitution, however, is costly for
revolvers, who accrue interest charges immediately after swiping their credit cards, so their
cash demand is less responsive to the opportunity cost of holding cash.
Another key result is that technological factors, which likely reflect transactions costs of
acquiring and managing cash, have a significant impact on consumer demand for cash in
the 21st century. After controling for primary cash withdrawal location, we do not find
evidence that bank density or ATM diffusion affects U.S. consumer demand for cash, unlike
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in Lippi and Secchi (2009), Amromin and Chakravorti (2009), and Carbo´-Valverde and
Rodr`ıguez-Fernande´z (2009), who found such effects, but did not have data on individual
cash management practices.4 However, some U.S. consumers now withdraw cash from
nonbank sources, such as retail stores (cash back from a debit card purchase), financial stores
(for example, check cashing), employers, and family members. These nonbank alternatives
supply cash at different transactions costs, which influences the amount and frequency of
cash withdrawals and holdings. We find that controlling for consumers’ source of cash in
the estimation increases the model’s fit substantially.
Together, these findings may have aggregate implications for the welfare cost of inflation.
Because revolvers’ cash demand is interest inelastic, their demand curve is vertical and
they are unlikely to reduce their cash holdings when inflation and short-term interest rates
rise, because that rate is significantly below the rate on credit card debt. According to
the SCPC, a nontrivial share of consumers report having revolving credit card debt (29.5
percent in 2010) and these revolvers hold a nontrivial share (25.2 percent) of the stock of
cash held by consumers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief review
of the most relevant literature. Section 1.3 contains a description of the new data used
in the paper. Section 1.4 reviews the theory behind microeconometric studies of money
demand. Section 1.6 explains our econometric approach used to derive the results described
in Section 1.7. Section 1.8 discusses the implications of our key result for the welfare cost
4This difference is hardly surprising: The SCPC provides a very good proxy for transactions costs at the
respondent level. The other studies could only proxy for this with more aggregate measures.
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of inflation literature, while Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The literature on money demand is vast and a full survey is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here, we briefly summarize the studies most relevant to this paper, mainly those based on
micro data estimation. For more comprehensive surveys of the money demand literature,
see Barnett, Fisher, and Serletis (1992) and Duca and VanHoose (2004).
From a macroeconomic perspective, the interest elasticity estimates at near-zero interest
rates are of crucial importance for accurate computations of the welfare cost of inflation
using Bailey (1956)’s method. This issue is at the core of the debate illustrated by Robert
E. Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009), both of which used aggregate data on M1 (cash plus
demand deposits) to estimate money demand. While our estimates are derived from only
a portion of the economy’s total money demand, consumers’ demand for cash, our interest
elasticity estimates are quite similar to the small negative elasticities found in macro studies
covering earlier time periods and broader measures of money.
An alternative approach to estimating money demand is to use micro data from household
and consumer surveys. Most such studies are also based on reduced-form estimations of
BT models of consumers’ demand for some component of money from time periods with
higher interest rates, making it unclear whether they would generalize to a low interest rate
environment. The latest cash demand study for the U.S. appears to be Daniels and Murphy
(1994), which used the Survey of Currency and Transaction Account Usage (SCTAU) from
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1984 and 1986. The authors estimated a very small, positive interest elasticity of cash
demand and noted that credit cards may explain this finding, as in the theoretical model of
Lewis (1974), but could not test their conjecture because the SCTAU does not contain credit
card data. Using the 1989 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (2000) estimated U.S. households’ demand for balances in demand deposit
accounts and emphasized the importance of the decision to adopt interest-bearing accounts
(extensive margin) for aggregate interest elasticity. However, due to a lack of interest rate
data, their estimate of the interest elasticity of interest-bearing account holders (intensive
margin) was imprecise.
Other recent studies of cash demand used micro data from European countries: Attanasio,
Guiso, and Jappelli (2002), Lippi and Secchi (2009), and Alvarez and Lippi (2009) for
Italy, Carbo´-Valverde and Rodr`ıguez-Fernande´z (2009) for Spain, Stix (2004) for Austria,
and Bounie and Francois (2008) for France. Our paper is closest to the methodology and
exposition in Lippi and Secchi (2009), which refined the cash demand estimates of Attanasio,
Guiso, and Jappelli (2002) by estimating a tractable, partial equilibrium model of the effects
of improvements in transactions technologies on cash demand. While we find significant
level effects of different account access technologies (for example, ATM users withdraw less
cash than those who use bank tellers), we do not find different interest elasticities by the
diffusion of technology. Alvarez and Lippi (2009) looks at the effect of technological change
in a model where cash spending is stochastic and confirms the finding of Lippi and Secchi
(2009) about the effects of technological change. Their model predicts the interest elasticity
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to converge to zero as the interest rate goes to zero, in line with our findings.
A few other studies have considered the link between credit cards and liquid assets.
Looking at the effect of credit card use on money demand, White (1976) found that credit
card users reduce the balance of their checking account by roughly the amount of credit
card spending and Duca and Whitesell (1995) found similar effects. However, neither of
these two studies estimated the interest elasticity of money demand.
Substitution from cash to credit by households has been introduced in a number of models
as a way to avoid the inflation tax at the social cost of costly credit provision (see Cooley and
Hansen (1991), Gillman (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and Khan, King, and Wolman
(2003)). However, to our knowledge, the empirical finding that credit card users who face
different borrowing rates appear to use this channel differently is novel. Telyukova (2013)
and Telyukova and Visschers (2013) use the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework to analyze
precautionary demand for liquid assets and its effects on the welfare cost of inflation. These
papers also use micro data to calibrate the key parameters governing the choice between
“cash” (which in their case includes checks and debit) and credit goods, but their focus is
on the effects of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In particular, they assume that credit and
money are perfect substitutes in the markets where credit is available. Our results show
that this assumption may not be an accurate description of consumers who revolve credit
card debt. Silva (2012) revisited the welfare cost of inflation estimates based on cash in
advance models and showed that incorporating multiple withdrawals over a period increases
these estimates substantially, but he did not consider the choice between credit cards and
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cash.
1.3 Data and Empirical Evidence
This section describes the data sources used in this study, presents descriptive statistics,
and discusses the key features of the data. See Appendix A.2 for more detailed variable
definitions.
1.3.1 Data Sources
The primary data source is the 2008–2010 SCPC, which contains comprehensive information
on consumer adoption and use of all common U.S. payment instruments, including cash
management practices. Each annual survey is administered to members of the American
Life Panel, a representative sample of U.S. adults (18+) originally developed by the RAND
Corporation. The reporting unit is a consumer, rather than a household, although some
household characteristics are included. The SCPC samples contain about 1,000 respondents
in 2008 and 2,000 in 2009–2010, with a significant longitudinal component. Roughly 85 to
90 percent of respondents return each year, so the pooled time-series cross-section of SCPC
data also forms an unbalanced panel with 715 panelists in all three years and about 1,900
in 2009–2010.5
The SCPC collects data on consumer cash holdings and cash withdrawals. For holdings,
consumers are asked how much cash they have in: 1) their pocket, purse, or wallet (referred
5For more detailed information about the SCPC, see Foster et al. (2009) and Foster et al. (2011).
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to as “cash in wallet”); and 2) their house, car, or other property (“cash on property”). Total
cash holdings is the sum of these two measures.6 The SCPC measures of cash holdings may
differ from balances consumers hold for actual cash transactions. Cash on property likely
includes holdings for speculative or other nontransactional purposes, but may also include
storage of some cash intended for transactions, so cash in wallet may understate actual cash
balances held for transactions.7 However, the relatively objective, tangible classification of
cash holdings by physical location may be easier for respondents to answer accurately.
For cash withdrawals, consumers are asked two questions: 1) the amount of cash they
withdraw most often (the modal amount); and 2) the number of withdrawals they make
in a typical month. Consumers are also asked each of these questions for two withdrawal
locations: 1) the location from which they withdraw cash most often (primary); and 2) all
other locations. The withdrawal amount question reduces the mental burden on respondents
to calculate averages of potentially diverse cash withdrawals. Consequently, the actual mean
withdrawal could differ significantly from the reported modal withdrawal.
To summarize, the SCPC cash measures are close, but not identical, to the concepts used
in basic theoretical models of cash demand. However, the usual (modal) amount of cash
6Because these questions do not require respondents to recall past behavior, cash holdings may be a more
accurate measure of cash activity. However, little is known about consumers’ willingness to report cash
holdings accurately, especially cash held for illegal purposes. Nevertheless, response rates are very high
and the largest reported values are tens of thousands of dollars.
7The SCPC measures of cash management are slightly different from those in Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli
(2002) and Lippi and Secchi (2009), which are based on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) collected by the Bank of Italy. The SHIW measures the amount of cash holdings a household
usually keeps for everyday expenses, which in theory corresponds better to the BT theory. However,
these types of responses depend on the (in)ability of respondents to accurately report their subjective,
intended transactions balances. In contrast, the SCPC relies on a less subjective measure of cash holdings
by a physical location (wallet or property) at the time of the survey. Each approach likely contains some
measurement error.
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withdrawal may be a better analogue to the cash withdrawal variable in the BT model than
actual withdrawals because the latter could be influenced by random events not captured
by the basic BT model.8 Similarly, the usual number of withdrawals at the favorite location
fits well with the theoretical concept, although it may be harder to accurately recall the
usual frequency of withdrawals than the usual amount withdrawn. Therefore, the regression
analysis focuses on the amount of cash usually withdrawn, the number of withdrawals, and
the cash in wallet measures, since these seem to be most closely related to transactions
balances.
The SCPC also contains data on the types of bank accounts held by consumers (checking
and saving), and the institutions in which they hold their primary accounts. However, the
SCPC does not contain data on the dollar amounts held in bank accounts or the oppor-
tunity cost of holding cash.9 For the latter, we turn to a second data source, the Bank
Rate Monitor (BRM) dataset (see Section 1.3.3 for details), which has these interest rate
data at the state level and is merged with the SCPC. In addition to providing data from
both before and during the low-interest environment, an important advantage of using the
SCPC longitudinal panel micro data to estimate cash demand is that the dataset gives
researchers the ability to identify interest elasticity by leveraging the time-varying cross-
sectional heterogeneity in consumer bank accounts and interest rates, which is unavailable
from aggregate times series data.
8For models with stochastic cash-flows, see Miller and Orr (1966), Bar-Ilan (1990), Bar-Ilan, Perry, and
Stadje (2004) and Alvarez and Lippi (2013).
9The SCPC collects data on consumers’ approximate interest rates (within a range) for their primary
checking and savings accounts. However, we use the BRM interest rate data instead because the SCPC
rate ranges are too wide, classifying most respondents into the same bracket.
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Figure 1.1: Cash withdrawals and interest rates over the sample period
Figure 1.1 illustrates our sample period and foreshadows the basic results of the paper. It
plots the usual amount of cash withdrawn per consumer from her primary location (bars)
along with the average yields for interest–bearing checking and money-market accounts for
2008–2010. Short-term interest rates declined notably from the period of the 2008 SCPC
to the period of the 2009 SCPC, which was conducted slightly later in the fall than in 2008
and 2010. Consistent with the basic theories of money demand, the decrease in yields was
mirrored by an increase in cash withdrawals over our sample period. Foster et al. (2011)
report that the cash share of monthly consumer payments also increased 7.4 percentage
points from 2008 to 2009.
Admittedly, this highly unusual period of financial crisis and recovery may hold alterna-
12
tive explanations for why consumer cash management practices changed, such as increased
attention to budgeting. However, analyzing individual-level data provides the flexibility and
potential benefit of controlling for a number of these alternative explanations. For example,
our analysis is restricted to the subsample of credit card adopters so that account closures
do not influence the results.
As an example of the need to control for micro heterogeneity, the SCPC provides strik-
ing evidence that cash management is affected by the location from which consumers ob-
tain their cash. Figure 1.2 displays the average amounts of cash withdrawn from seven
locations—ATM, bank teller, check cashing store, cash back from a debit card purchase (at
a retail store), employer, family, and other—and the shares of consumers who most often
withdraw cash from that location. The average amount of cash withdrawal varies widely,
from less than $50 for cash back to about $300 at a check cashing store. Not surprisingly,
most consumers (about four-fifths) get cash most often from an ATM or bank teller. But
even among these most common locations the amount withdrawn varies significantly, as
amounts withdrawn from bank tellers are almost twice as much as withdrawals from an
ATM. Very large amounts are also withdrawn from employers and check cashers, although
relatively few consumers get their cash from these locations.
The types of withdrawal locations, and the variation in withdrawal amounts across them,
suggest diversity in transaction costs across locations of cash withdrawals for consumers.
Econometrically, accounting for this withdrawal heterogeneity is important for fitting the
cash withdrawal data well. It also serves as an approximate individual fixed effect, which
13
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Figure 1.2: Cash withdrawals by location
cannot be included in the econometric model due to an insufficient number of time-series
observations per consumer, by representing the mean withdrawal of consumers grouped by
primary location.
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.2 reports descriptive statistics for the key variables for the entire SCPC sample
(first three columns) and the econometric estimation subsample (remaining three columns),
which comprises only consumers who had adopted a credit card and interest-bearing bank
account (100 percent adoption rates in both cases). Section 1.6.1 describes the motivation
and methodology of the sample selection in more detail.
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Consumers withdraw more than $100 in a typical transaction and keep a little more than
half of this amount in their wallet on average. The relationship between cash in wallet
and on property is particularly interesting. While average cash holdings on property are
up to four times higher than cash in wallet, the median of the cash on property variable
is only half the size of median cash holdings in wallet. For the cash variables in general,
average values are much higher than the median values and the standard deviations are
quite large, especially in 2010. Together, these facts reflect the existence of a relatively
small proportion of consumers who hold and withdraw very large amounts of cash. The
number of cash withdrawals ranges from 4.3 to 5.7 per month.
Adoption rates are very high for checking accounts (91 percent or more) and any interest–
bearing account (82 percent or more). The adoption of savings accounts decreases about 7
percentage points from 2008 to 2009, most likely due to a change in the survey questionnaire,
and then stays flat. More importantly, only 15 to 20 percent of the respondents do not have
some type of interest–bearing accounts in the three sample years.10 About 85 percent of
consumers have an ATM or debit card. Credit card adoption by consumers was 78.3 percent
in 2008 but dropped to 71.2 percent by 2010. About 30 percent of all individuals in the
SCPC revolve credit card balances, and the incidence of revolving also decreases over the
sample period.11
10This number is substantially lower than in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), which found 59 percent
of U.S. households did not have interest–bearing financial assets in their sample. However, according
to their definition, interest–bearing checking accounts did not count as interest–bearing financial assets
because their study focused on the substitution between assets in M1 and the non-M1 part of M2 (or even
broader aggregates), In contrast, our paper focuses on the management of cash and noncash instruments.
11In the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the incidence of revolving credit card debt is even higher,
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Full sample Estimation sample
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Cash management ($)
Amount usually withdrawn 102 119 110 104 129 114
50 60 57 60 64 74
(140) (167) (184) (132) (191) (135)
Cash in wallet 79 69 64 63 77 74
30 35 30 30 40 45
(310) (113) (107) (100) (131) (87)
Cash on property 157 229 275 206 265 385
14 20 15 20 25 50
(577) (933) (1831) (767) (1168) (2534)
Total cash holdings 230 291 326 265 334 438
70 80 70 80 95 110
(659) (943) (1812) (781) (1172) (2475)
Number of withdrawals (per month) 4.3 5.1 5.7 4.4 5.1 5.5
3 4 4 4 3 3
(6.4) (7.4) (9.1) (6.6) (8.6) (8.9)
Account adoption (%)
Checking account adopter 91.3 91.8 93.5 99.5 98.9 99.6
(28.3) (27.4) (24.7) (7.0) (10.4) (6.0)
Savings account adopter 78.0 71.3 70.1 91.7 91.8 87.9
(41.4) (45.3) (45.8) (27.6) (27.5) (32.6)
Money market account adopter . 28.8 23.3 . 39.2 35.7
(.) (45.3) (42.3) (.) (48.8) (47.9)
Any interest bearing account adopter 84.6 80.8 82.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(36.1) (39.4) (38.4) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Branches (per 1000 residents) 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
Payment methods (%)
Debit or ATM card adopter 84.9 84.0 85.3 89.4 90.5 88.6
(35.8) (36.7) (35.4) (30.8) (29.4) (31.8)
Credit card adopter 78.3 72.2 71.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
(41.3) (44.8) (45.3) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Revolver 35.9 29.1 29.5 47.3 45.5 42.2
(48.0) (45.4) (45.6) (50.0) (49.8) (49.4)
Source: SCPC 2008–2010
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics
Table entries are means, medians, and standard deviations (in parenthesis).
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1.3.3 Interest rates
BRM data on interest rates were combined with the SCPC data to produce a measure of
the opportunity cost of holding cash.12 The SCPC data indicate whether a respondent has
an interest-bearing checking account or a savings account, which is assumed to pay interest,
and the type of financial institution where respondents hold their primary checking and
primary savings accounts (commercial bank, savings and loan, credit union, internet bank
or brokerage firm). We group all noncommercial bank institutions into a single category
called “thrift” and assume that savings accounts pay the same interest as money market
accounts, as is observed in the BRM data. Then we use four (weekly average) interest-
rate series from the BRM to construct consumer-level opportunity costs for each of the
four account types: state-level average interest yields on checking accounts at commercial
banks and at thrifts, and state-level average interest yields on money market accounts at
commercial banks and at thrifts. The BRM and SCPC data are merged by the respondents’
state of residence and date of survey response.
Formally, the interest rate variable for an account is constructed as follows. Let Ra,bst
denote the average interest yield on account type a, in bank type b, in state s, on the
week t during which the respondent filled out the survey, where a ∈ {ch,mm} and ch
denotes interest–bearing checking account and mm stands for money market accounts,
at 37 percent, but the SCF does not report cash holdings.
12Micro level datasets on cash holdings rarely provide data on bank account interest rates, with the exception
of the SCTAU used in Daniels and Murphy (1994). Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002) and Lippi and
Secchi (2009) used county-level average interest rates for Italy to complement their cash holding data,
while Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) used marginal tax rates as a proxy for interest rates.
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Commercial banks Thrifts Opportunity
checking mmkt. checking mmkt. cost
Rch,cb Rch,th Rmm,cb Rmm,th R˜
2008 .118 .342 .641 .729 .418
(.05) (.196) (.18) (.481) (.336)
2009 .064 .155 .222 .413 .179
(.026) (.087) (.109) (.199) (.161)
2010 .065 .144 .127 .281 .124
(.026) (.073) (.038) (.122) (.099)
Source: RateWatch
Table 1.3: Means and (standard deviations) of interest rate series in the estimation sample
while b ∈ {cb, th}, where cb denotes commercial bank and th stands for thrift. To clarify
the construction, consider the following example. Suppose a respondent reported having an
interest–bearing checking account at a commercial bank and a savings account at a credit
union. Then she would earn Rch,cbst , R
mm,th
st on these accounts (respectively).
If a respondent has more than one interest–bearing account, the lowest interest rate
among accounts is chosen as her opportunity cost of holding cash. Hence, the opportunity
cost for the respondent in the preceding example would be R˜it = min
(
Rch,cbst , R
mm,th
st
)
.13
The decision to use the lowest interest rate paid is based on the assumption that it is
associated with the most liquid account, hence the closest substitute for cash.
Time-series estimates of the average account interest rates and opportunity cost are shown
in Table 1.3. As in Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002), we find substantial cross-sectional
variation in interest rates that is helpful in identifying cash demand. The standard deviation
13For a precise, yet cumbersome, definition of the opportunity cost R˜it, let Ia,bit be the indicator variable
denoting respondent i’s adoption of account type a at bank type b at time t, and Iit = {(a, b) ∈
{ch,mm} × {cb, th} : Ia,bit = 1} denote the set of account type, bank type combinations (a, b) that
respondent i has adopted at time t. The opportunity cost is then R˜it = min(a,b)∈Iit R
a,b
st .
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of the interest-rate variables is around 50 percent (and more than one-third) of the mean in
every year.14 Figure A.1 in Appendix A.2 shows that there is substantial variation in our
measure of the opportunity cost even within states. That is, our econometric identification
of interest elasticity does not rely solely on interest rate differences across states or across
years, but it also exploits the variation in interest rates across different types of bank
accounts in a given state and year.
1.4 Cash inventory management
A staple of the U.S. payments markets, more so than in the rest of the world, is the
widespread use of credit cards. Therefore this section will review an extension of the
Baumol-Tobin model by Sastry (1970) (see also Lewis (1974)) that allows for the use of
credit cards.15 The analytical tractability of this model makes it an ideal tool to illustrate
the main point of this paper: The interest elasticity of cash demand changes with the in-
terest rate paid on credit card debt. The presence of credit cards opens a new way for
consumers to economize on cash holding costs: Paying for a larger fraction of transactions
with credit card enables them to reduce cash holdings without a corresponding increase in
the frequency of costly cash withdrawals. This strategy, however, becomes less attractive
as interest rates paid on credit card balances increase.
14Part of this variation might come from different composition of accounts across states. For example,
in richer states more people may hold checking accounts with high minimum balance requirements and
correspondingly higher interest rates, which would give that state a high average checking account interest
rate.
15Bar-Ilan (1990) extended this model to include a stochastic cash-flow process.
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Figure 1.3: Baumol-Tobin model with borrowing
The main difference compared to the BT model is that consumers can now go into debt. Withdrawals
occur after cash holdings have been depleted, meaning that consumers accumulate some debt (D)
during the process. At the moment of the withdrawal this debt is repaid, hence the cash balance
after withdrawing W will be M < W .
In this version of the BT model consumers who run out of cash can keep transacting at
the marginal cost of the credit card borrowing rate, instead of paying the fixed cost of cash
withdrawal. At the time of running out of cash, the marginal cost of using cash for the
next transaction is infinite, so some credit use will always be optimal. However, the rising
total cost of using credit (credit card interest times the accumulated debt) will eventually
outweigh the cost of using cash (fixed withdrawal cost plus forgone interest) if the credit
card interest rate is higher than the interest earned on money kept at the bank.
Formally, the problem can be stated as:16
minM,W,D R ·M + b · C
W
+Rcc ·D,
s.t. M =
M
2
2W
D =
(W −M)2
2W
,
where M denotes average cash holdings, M denotes cash holdings after withdrawals, W
denotes the amount withdrawn (part of which is immediately spent on repaying the out-
16For details about the model setup and solution see Sastry (1970).
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standing balance on credit cards), and D denotes average credit card debt over the period.
Note that this model nests the original BT model, when D = 0, that is W = M . In the case
with D > 0, however, consumers have to make two decisions: how much cash to withdraw
(W ) and how much debt to incur before a cash withdrawal (W −M).17 The solution for
withdrawals and cash holdings is
W =
(
2 · C · b
R
) 1
2
(
Rcc
R+Rcc
) 1
2
, (1.1)
M =
W
2
=
(
C · b
2R
) 1
2
(
Rcc
R+Rcc
) 1
2
. (1.2)
As borrowing becomes prohibitively expensive, Rcc → ∞, these formulas collapse to the
square-root rule of the BT model. In general, however, the interest elasticity of cash holding
becomes ∂M∂R = −0.5
[
1 + RR+Rcc
]
, meaning that the interest elasticity of cash demand is a
function of the credit card interest rate. In particular, a higher credit card interest rate,
ceteris paribus, leads to a lower interest elasticity (in absolute value). This is the implication
of the model that we will test on our data.
17Since the model is deterministic, it is never optimal for the decisionmaker to withdraw cash before her cash
holdings are depleted. As Alvarez and Lippi (2009) and Miller and Orr (1966) show, with a stochastic
consumption flow individuals would get cash sooner, as a precaution against running out of cash and
thereby forgoing a consumption opportunity.
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1.5 Money demand specification
Taking logs of the solution of the inventory management problem, equation (1.2), yields
log(M) = 0.5 · log
(
b
2
)
+ 0.5 · log(C) + 0.5 · log(Rcc)− 0.5 · log(R(R+Rcc)), (1.3)
which is similar to the specification used in most of the microeconometric studies of cash
demand. Unfortunately, the SCPC does not provide data directly on many of the variables
in equation (1.3). To control for the effects of these variables in our specification, we follow
the tradition in the literature (for example, Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002), Lippi
and Secchi (2009)) and use proxies.
In particular, the cost of withdrawing cash (b) and cash expenditures (C) will be proxied
by Xit, a vector of variables including demographic characteristics
18, indicator variables for
primary withdrawal method, (the log of) household income, and (the log of) the share of
cash transactions in the total number of transactions.19
Credit card interest rates are not directly recorded in the SCPC, either, but we can exploit
a particular source of variation in the data: Convenience users of credit cards (those who
pay off their full balance at the end of the billing cycle) pay no interest on their current
balance, while revolvers pay Rcc even for new purchases as soon as their card is swiped at
the register (with the exception of a few high-end credit cards). Hence the cash demand
18For the full list of individual characteristics, please refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
19The SCPC asks questions about the number of transaction in a typical month; information on the dollar
value of these transactions is not collected. The value of cash transactions tends to be smaller on average
than transactions made by other payment methods, as shown in Bagnall et al. (2013).
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specification that our data allows us to estimate is
log(Mit) =β0 + τ2009 + τ2010 + β1 · log(R˜it) + β2 · log(R˜it)× revolverit+
β3 · revolverit +X ′itγ + it,
(1.4)
where Mit denotes one of the three cash variables of interest (the “usual amount of cash
withdrawal at primary location” or the number of withdrawals or cash in wallet); β0 and the
τs form a time-varying intercept; R˜it denotes the alternative cost of holding cash; revolverit
denotes if household i revolves credit card debt in year t, we allow for this variable to have
both an effect on the interest elasticity, β2, and a level effect, β3.
The error term it has two sources: First, it accounts for individual heterogeneity not
observed by the econometrician. Second, there is likely to be measurement error in the
dependent variables, resulting from the fact that the variables in the SCPC do not corre-
spond perfectly to their counterparts in the Baumol-Tobin model. For example, withdrawals
measure the usual amount withdrawn at the most frequently visited withdrawal location,
not from all locations.20 Although cash in wallet is measured more accurately, it may not
correspond exactly to cash holdings used to finance everyday expenditures, as noted in
Section 1.3.
20Withdrawals also have a nonstandard distribution, in that, it is a mixture of continuous distributions
(resulting from, say, withdrawals at the bank) and discrete distributions (ATM withdrawal). This means
that the error in the regression with the usual withdrawal amount on the left-hand side is clearly not
normally distributed, but the central limit theorem still applies; hence our estimates are asymptotically
normally distributed.
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1.6 Estimation method
An implicit assumption behind the above model is that the decisionmaker has an interest-
bearing bank account and a credit card. However, as Table 1.2 shows, this is not true for all
U.S. consumers. Moreover, the decision to open such an account or apply for a credit card
is probably affected by the expected reduction in transactions costs that these instruments
could provide for consumers and thereby might be related to the unobserved factors in
equation (1.4). To correct for this self-selection, microeconometric studies of money demand
model the adoption of bank accounts and payment instruments before the money demand
equations are estimated. We also used a two-step estimator similar to Heckman (1979):
First estimating random effect probit equations for interest-bearing account and credit card
adoption, then using the resulting inverse Mills ratios as explanatory variables in the cash
demand equation (second step) estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS).
1.6.1 Adoption of interest-bearing accounts and payment instruments
The adoption decision for the interest-bearing checking account and credit card are assumed
to be separate choices.21 In both cases it is assumed to take the form of a cost-benefit
analysis, as in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002).
The benefits can be thought of as interest income, or less time spent with completing
transactions, while the costs usually include setup costs and use or maintenance costs (for
21See Koulayev et al. (2012a) for a model with more payment instruments, where individuals adopt a
portfolio of payment instruments and take into account the substitutability and complementarity of all
the instruments simultaneously.
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example, monthly account or card fees, minimum balance requirements). Data are available
on some of these factors, such as financial wealth and interest rates. Other inputs of the
adoption decision, such as the time it takes to understand the workings of a new payment
instrument, are not measured directly and will be proxied with demographic variables. If
the net benefits, benefits minus costs, are positive the individual will choose to adopt an
instrument,
z∗it = θ0 + θ1 · Yit + θ2 · wealthit + θ3Rch,cbst + X˜ ′itθ4 +A′itθ5 + ci + νit (1.5)
zit =

1 z∗it > 0
0 z∗it ≤ 0
,
where zit is a binary variable indicating adoption of an interest-bearing bank account or
credit card, z∗it is a continuous latent variable measuring the net benefit of adoption, Yit
denotes family income, wealthit is net financial wealth, R
ch,cb
st measures the prevailing com-
mercial bank checking account interest rate in respondent i’s state of residence, X˜it is a
vector of demographic characteristics, Ait is a vector of the respondent i’s assessments in
year t of the acceptance, security, and cost of credit cards relative to debit cards and cash,
and ci + νit is a composite error term that includes an individual-specific random effect, ci,
and a component that varies across both individuals and time periods, νit. We interpret
the error term as the sum of all other factors that are known to the decisionmaker, but
not to the econometrician, as in Chapter 2 of Train (2009), and assume that it is inde-
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pendent of all other explanatory variables and follows a standard normal distribution.22
The variables that are included in the selection equations, equation (1.5), but not in the
cash demand regressions are: the ratio of bank branches to population at the state level
and indicator variables for race, education, respondents’ income rank within the household,
home ownership, and being born outside the U.S.
Using the inverse Mills ratios from the random-effect probit equations for credit card
and interest–bearing account adoption23 in the second-stage regressions will eliminate the
potential self-selection bias. The second-stage equation becomes,
log(Mit) =β0 + τ2009 + τ2010 + β1 · log(R˜it) + β2 · log(R˜it)× revolverit+
β3 · revolverit + γ′Xit + ρ′λit + εit,
(1.6)
where λit is a vector of the inverse Mills ratios computed from equation (1.5). Inclusion of
the inverse Mills ratios means that the error term in equation (1.6), εit, is independent of
the composite errors in the adoption equations and has a mean of zero.24
Since our sample is relatively small and shrinks further due to missing or zero observations,
we estimated the second-stage equations on a pooled cross-section of all households from
22νait, ν
c
it (where superscripts a, c denote the equation for interest-bearing account and credit card adoption,
respectively) are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and follow a standard normal distribution, while cai ,
cci are normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
cai
and σ2cci , respectively. The error terms in the
adoption equations (cai ,ν
a
it,c
c
i ,ν
c
it) are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. Potential self-selection
means that the error term in equation (1.4), it, might not be independent of the composite error terms
cai + ν
a
it, c
c
i + ν
c
it.
23Computation of the inverse Mills-ratios takes into account that there are two sources of unobserved
heterogeneity in the adoption equations: ci and νit; therefore, z
∗
it is normally distributed with variance
σ2c + σ
2
ν , where σ
2
ν is normalized to 1.
24This is true under the assumption that E [it|z∗ita, z∗itc] is linear in (cai + νait) and (cci + νcit).
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the three waves of the survey using simple OLS.25
1.6.2 Standard errors
As already noted above, the SCPC tries to maintain a panel of respondents, so many
of them appear in more than one wave of the survey (for details on this see Table A.3
Appendix A.2).26 These repeated respondents in the sample and the generated regressors
(the inverse Mills ratios) in the two-step estimation procedure cause the OLS standard errors
to be biased. Therefore, like previous studies in the literature, such as Lippi and Secchi
(2009), we derive bootstrapped standard errors, using 1,000 repetitions. Given the panel
structure of the sample, the bootstrapping procedure itself is not entirely straightforward.
Instead of bootstrapping the observations, we bootstrapped individuals, thus making sure
that the composition of every bootstrap sample remained the same as the original one in
terms of the number of respondents from each year, pair, or triplet of years.
25To check the robustness of the findings, we dropped the 306 panel observations from 2009, re-ran the
estimations, and got similar results. In another robustness check, we kept only the panelists and re-ran the
estimations using OLS in the second stage and again found similar results. With a fixed-effect estimator
on the panel sample the results changed markedly; the point estimates became mostly insignificant. Since
we have only two observations per respondent to estimate individual fixed effects, we do not take this
result as conclusive evidence against our specification and plan to revisit the issue of panel estimation
once additional data become available.
26This structure is not unique to the SCPC. For example, the SHIW data also have a subset of respondents
who are surveyed in multiple waves.
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1.7 Results
1.7.1 Adoption equation
The adoption equations for interest–bearing accounts and credit cards are presented in
Table 1.4. The reported numbers are the marginal effects computed at the sample means.
The predictive power of the model of interest–bearing account ownership is quite low,
with a pseudo-R2 of about 0.05. Adoption is affected significantly only by income, financial
wealth, education, and home ownership. The probability of account adoption increases by
1.8 percent after a 1 percent increase in income and by 0.3 percent after a similar change
in wealth. The marginal effect of having less than a college education is of roughly the
same magnitude as a 1 percent decrease in income for high-school graduates and equivalent
to about a 2 percent decrease in income for high-school dropouts, compared with college
graduates (omitted category). Home ownership raises the probability of account adoption
by 2.5 percent. Other studies on bank account adoption, for example Schuh and Stavins
(2012) and Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee (2005), also found significant effects of socioeco-
nomic variables, although the explanatory power of Schuh and Stavins (2012) is similar
to ours. More importantly for the money demand literature, unlike in Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin (2000), interest rates do not affect interest–bearing account adoption, although,
as noted earlier in footnote 10, a direct comparison with their results is difficult, due to
the different definitions of interest–bearing accounts. The random–effects component (ci in
equation (1.5)) is highly significant, justifying the choice of the econometric specification.
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Interest–bearing account Credit card
log(comm. bank checking rate) .004 (.007) −.007 (.008)
log(Income) .018∗∗∗ (.005) .047∗∗∗ (.006)
log(Wealth) .003∗∗ (.002) .006∗∗∗ (.002)
Age −.000 (.000) .002∗∗∗ (.000)
Latino .004 (.014) −.018 (.016)
Black .005 (.012) −.055∗∗∗ (.013)
Male −.002 (.006) −.011 (.008)
Less than high-school educated −.040∗∗ (.021) −.076∗∗∗ (.024)
High-school educated −.020∗∗ (.009) −.044∗∗∗ (.009)
Single −.011 (.011) .006 (.013)
Married −.005 (.009) .002 (.010)
Number of household members −.003 (.002) −.012∗∗∗ (.003)
Employed .007 (.008) −.019∗ (.010)
Unemployed −.008 (.013) −.026∗ (.015)
Disabled −.010 (.015) −.077∗∗∗ (.017)
Self-employed −.010 (.010) .016 (.013)
Income rank: 1st .011 (.011) .039∗∗∗ (.012)
Income rank: 2nd .011 (.013) .034∗∗ (.014)
Income rank: 3rd .007 (.011) .010 (.012)
Homeowner .025∗∗∗ (.009) .025∗∗∗ (.008)
Born abroad −.022∗ (.012) .049∗∗∗ (.019)
Branches (per 1000 residents) .023 (.021) .026 (.025)
Year 2009 −.010 (.008) −.004 (.008)
Year 2010 −.014∗ (.008) −.024∗∗∗ (.008)
Cost .019∗∗∗ (.006)
Security .011∗ (.006)
Acceptance .059∗∗∗ (.015)
Share of σ2c + σ
2
ν explained by RE .663 .885
p-value of H0 : σ
2
c = 0 .000 .000
Pseudo R2 .051 .193
Observations 3,728 3,738
Marginal effects
Table 1.4: Adoption equations
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Credit card adoption is better explained by our model, as evidenced by the pseudo-R2
of 0.19. It is also heavily influenced by income: A 1 percent increase in income leads to
a 4.7 percent increase in the probability of credit card adoption. The effect of financial
wealth and education on credit card adoption is about twice as large as on interest–bearing
account adoption. African-Americans are 5.5 percent less likely to have credit cards than
white people (omitted category). Bigger households are also less likely to have credit cards
and so are disabled people. Income ranking within the family also matters: breadwinners
are more likely to own credit cards. Home ownership and being born abroad both increase
the likelihood of having a credit card. Acceptance and the cost of using credit cards are
both important for the adoption decision. Credit card adoption is unaffected by the interest
rates on checking accounts. It would be interesting to see how credit card interest rates
affect credit card adoption, but we have no data on this. What is interesting from this
result, however, is that if credit card interest rates affect adoption, it has to be the result of
changes in those rates that are orthogonal to checking account rates. We find evidence of a
significant decrease in credit card adoption in 2010 compared with the previous two years,
and again the random–effects term plays an important role in explaining the autocorrelation
of the adoption decision over time for the same respondent.
1.7.2 Cash demand equations
The next subsections discuss the results of the cash-demand estimation using (the loga-
rithms of) withdrawal amounts, cash in wallet, and number of withdrawals as the depen-
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dent variables. The reported regressions were estimated on a subsample of respondents
with interest–bearing account and credit cards; depending on the number of available ob-
servations on the left-hand side variable, the estimation samples consist of 2,363 to 2,440
observations.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 contain five different models using, separately, the withdrawal amount
and cash in wallet as the dependent variable, with our preferred specification in the last
column. As the tables show, most of the point estimates are fairly robust to the various
specifications. The full estimation output is reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
Cash withdrawals
The first two columns highlight the main finding of the paper. The first column in Ta-
ble 1.5 can be interpreted as a test of the original BT model without distinguishing between
revolvers and convenience users. (All regressions, however, control for demographic charac-
teristics and include year and month fixed effects.27) The second column controls for this
difference using the “revolver” indicator variable and its interaction with the opportunity
cost of holding cash.
While the first model finds highly significant effects of income and financial wealth on
usual cash withdrawals with the expected positive sign and sensible magnitude, it fails to
identify a significant interest elasticity. The second column shows that the failure to do so
could be the result of restricting the interest elasticity of convenience users and revolvers to
27While most of the responses for the SCPC arrive in October, some respondents fill out the surveys later.
In 2009, in particular, many responses were recorded in November.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Interest rate) −.009 −.049 −.064∗ −.064∗ −.047
(.025) (.034) (.033) (.033) (.029)
log(Interest rate) × Revolver .094∗∗ .104∗∗ .107∗∗ .111∗∗∗
(.044) (.043) (.044) (.039)
log(Cash share) .177∗∗∗ .175∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗
(.020) (.020) (.019)
log(Income) .151∗∗∗ .142∗∗∗ .168∗∗∗ .219∗∗∗ .264∗∗∗
(.037) (.037) (.035) (.054) (.053)
log(Wealth) .084∗∗∗ .076∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗ .078∗∗∗ .072∗∗∗
(.014) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015)
Revolver −.026 .016 .026 .035
(.103) (.101) (.101) (.089)
Withdrawal Method:
Bank teller .364∗∗∗
(.050)
Check casher .370
(.365)
Cashback −.762∗∗∗
(.050)
Employer .508∗∗∗
(.179)
Family −.607∗∗∗
(.116)
Other .371
(.263)
Mills ratios:
Interest–bearing account .956 1.105∗
(.629) (.539)
Credit card −.101 −.090
(.282) (.248)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .111 .125 .159 .160 .284
Observations 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.5: Specifications for “usual amount of cash withdrawal” regression
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be the same. As predicted by the model in Section 1.4, the interest elasticity of revolvers
is significantly bigger (not in absolute value) than that of convenience users. While the
interest elasticity of convenience users is never significantly different from zero (at the 5
percent level), the point estimate is remarkably close to what Lippi and Secchi (2009)
found on recent data for Italy and is in line with the theoretical model of Alvarez and
Lippi (2009), which predicts that the interest elasticity of cash demand goes to zero as the
interest rate approaches zero. Remarkably, Daniels and Murphy (1994) estimated a small
but significantly positive interest elasticity of cash demand for the United States using data
from the mid-1980’s. While they noted that credit card use might explain this finding, their
data did not allow controlling for differences in credit card interest rates.
Adding a measure of cash use intensity (share of the number of cash transactions in
total transactions) to the list of explanatory variables in the third column changes little
of the qualitative results, although the variable itself is highly significant. Correcting for
self-selection, in column 4, causes the income elasticity to increase substantially, but has
little effect otherwise, mostly because the Mills ratios do not appear to be very significant.
This specification also borrows from Lippi and Secchi (2009) and allows for the interest
elasticities to differ by the number of bank branches per capita (measured at the state
level), but this seems to make little difference in our sample.28
Finally, the benchmark model in the last column allows for the most preferred cash
withdrawal method to have a level effect on the (log of) the amount withdrawn. Compared
28Note that for ATM card holders this variable was also insignificant in Lippi and Secchi (2009) and, as
shown in Table 1.2, about 90 percent of our estimation sample have a debit or ATM card.
33
with ATM users (omitted category), people who get cash at the bank teller or from their
employer tend to withdraw 36.5 and 51.0 percent more cash, respectively. Getting cash
from family members or as cash back at a retail store, on the other hand, leads to smaller
withdrawal amounts by 60.3 and 75.8 percent, respectively. These findings extend the
results from recent cash demand estimations, such as Lippi and Secchi (2009) and Stix
(2004), which found significant negative effects of ATM networks on cash withdrawals and
holdings compared with other locations. While adding these variables nearly doubles the
adjusted R2 of the regression, they have very little effect on the income, wealth, or interest
elasticities.
Cash holdings in purse, pocket and wallet
Table 1.6 shows analogous results with the log of cash in wallet as the dependent variable.
The main difference compared to Table 1.5 is the significance level of the interest elasticity
estimates, primarily due to more imprecisely estimated coefficients. The revolver interac-
tion term only turns significant at the 10 percent level once we control for the share of
cash transactions, although the point estimates are comparable to those in the withdrawal
amount regression. The primary withdrawal location variables seem to matter a little less
for cash holdings than they do for withdrawals, possibly showing that respondents use more
than one source of cash frequently. In fact, according to the SCPC, about one third of the
withdrawals happen at the secondary source. In general, the explanatory power of these
regressions is lower than for primary withdrawals, with the adjusted R2 at 0.208 compared
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Interest rate) −.034 −.070∗ −.085∗∗ −.087∗∗ −.082∗∗
(.032) (.041) (.040) (.040) (.040)
log(Interest rate) × Revolver .085 .096∗ .099∗ .100∗
(.056) (.055) (.054) (.054)
log(Cash share) .209∗∗∗ .207∗∗∗ .190∗∗∗
(.026) (.026) (.025)
log(Income) .253∗∗∗ .241∗∗∗ .273∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .333∗∗∗
(.046) (.047) (.046) (.074) (.070)
log(Wealth) .091∗∗∗ .082∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ .079∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017)
Revolver −.088 −.041 −.037 −.014
(.128) (.124) (.124) (.123)
Withdrawal Method:
Bank teller .272∗∗∗
(.061)
Check casher .510
(.371)
Cashback −.294∗∗∗
(.075)
Employer .263
(.172)
Family .062
(.145)
Other .588∗∗∗
(.189)
Mills ratios:
Interest–bearing account .188 .270
(.758) (.689)
Credit card .116 .046
(.366) (.332)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .148 .159 .187 .187 .206
Observations 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.6: Specifications for “cash in wallet” regression
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to 0.285 in the specification for withdrawal amount.
Number of withdrawals
Note that in the BT model the interest elasticity of the number of withdrawals is the inverse
of the interest elasticity of the withdrawal amount, since the number of withdrawals is the
ratio of total cash expenditure and the withdrawal amount.29 The estimation results are
displayed in Table A.1. While the estimated interest elasticities have the predicted signs,
they are insignificant. Income and cash share elasticities are in line with the estimates
obtained in the other regressions, but the sign of the financial wealth variable is the opposite
of what we expected. All in all, this specification performs the worst, consistent with our
prior that respondents’ recall of the number of withdrawals is probably less precise than
their recall of the usual amount they withdraw.
1.7.3 Robustness
One potential objection to the identification is that the share of cash transactions in total
transactions may be endogenous to cash withdrawals or cash holdings. To alleviate these
concerns, Table A.2 presents the GMM distance statistics for the test of the exogeneity of
the cash share variable, as implemented by the ivreg2 command of Stata; for example, see
Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007).
For both withdrawal amounts and cash in wallet as the dependent variable the test
29This is the source of the welfare cost of inflation: Higher nominal interest rates result in more withdrawals,
which involve a fixed resource cost.
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cannot reject the null hypothesis that the (log of) cash share variable is exogenous in our
benchmark model. The test compares our benchmark model with one that treats (the log of)
the cash share variable as endogenous and instruments it using respondents’ self-reported
assessment of security and cost of cash relative to credit and debit cards (see Appendix A.2
for details on how these measures were constructed). The Hansen J-test indicates that the
instruments were rightfully excluded from the cash demand regressions, while the GMM
distance statistics show that the model where cash share is instrumented for yields similar
estimates to our benchmark specification, that is, the model that is consistently estimated
is not significantly different from the model that was suspected of being inconsistently
estimated due to the potential endogeneity of the cash share variable.
1.8 Implications for the welfare cost of inflation
Our estimation reveals economically and statistically significant differences in the interest
elasticity of cash demand by credit card users with different borrowing behavior and op-
portunity costs. Figure 1.4 illustrates the results in two ways that portray the potential
implications for the welfare cost of inflation associated with the currency portion of money.
The left panel of Figure 1.4 plots estimated cash demand functions for revolvers and
convenience users from the regression results for cash in wallet. The demand function for
convenience users exhibits the standard, negative, nonlinear shape that is consistent with
previous estimation of money demand. As explained in Robert E. Lucas (2000) and Ireland
(2009), the welfare cost of inflation associated with this demand equals the total area under
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Figure 1.4: Cash demand function of convenience users and revolvers (left) and average
cash demand with and without accounting for revolvers (right)
this demand curve less seigniorage revenue at the steady-state nominal interest rate (real
rate plus expected inflation). In sharp contrast, the estimated function for revolvers is
essentially vertical—having a slight positive but statistically insignificant slope—revealing
interest-inelastic cash demand. Therefore, the area “under” the revolvers’ demand curve is
much smaller, and revolvers do not substitute away from cash when the interest rate (or
inflation) increases. Aggregate welfare loss depends on the relative weight of revolvers in
the population, which Table 1.2 showed is nearly one third of U.S. adults based on SCPC
data, so the impact is not trivial.
A second implication of the results appears in the right panel of Figure 1.4, which plots
two estimated cash demand functions stemming from different treatments of the underlying
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heterogeneity in the data. The longer-dashed line represents the weighted average of the
demand functions in the left panel, where the weight is the share of revolvers in the estima-
tion sample. The shorter-dashed line is the demand function from a regression that uses the
same estimation sample but does not control for the microeconomic heterogeneity of cash
behavior. In particular, it restricts the interest elasticity to be the same for revolvers and
convenience users, making the homogeneous-consumer regression susceptible to aggrega-
tion bias. Indeed, the demand function for the homogeneous-consumer regression is shifted
significantly to the right of the demand function that accommodates micro heterogeneity.
Here, one can easily see the main implication—accounting for micro heterogeneity lowers
the welfare cost of inflation by shifting the cash demand curve to the left and reducing the
area under the demand curve. Previous studies on the welfare cost of inflation that did not
account for different interest elasticities, such as Cooley and Hansen (1991), Gillman (1993),
Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and Khan, King, and Wolman (2003), may have overestimated
the welfare cost of inflation.
Our regression results may also have implications for the debate between Robert E. Lu-
cas (2000) and Ireland (2009). Estimation of our model using the semi-log specification
advocated by Ireland produced insignificant estimates of the interest elasticity and poorer
fit overall (results not reported here). This finding, combined with the relative success of
our log-log specification, motivates an examination of the model specification issue using
aggregate data on cash demand during the recent period of low interest rates.
Figure 1.5 plots aggregate time-series data for the U.S. domestic stock of currency in
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circulation from 1964 to 2012 analogous to the figures in Ireland (2009) for M1 running
through 2006.30 It is immediately apparent from the figure that the extra data points
after Ireland’s sample (after 2006) show a clear, nonlinear bend during the low interest
rate environment that appears much more consistent with Lucas’ log-log specification than
with the linear function of Ireland’s semi-log specification. The two lines in the graph show
estimated cash demand functions for the two specifications; by all measures, the log-log
specification dominates in the aggregate data as well as in our micro data regressions.
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Figure 1.5: U.S. domestic currency demand 1964–2012
Although interesting and applicable to part of our results, these aggregate regressions
overlook the importance of the micro heterogeneity in cash demand across consumers. Our
30We subtracted cash holdings of the Rest of the World reported in the Flow of Funds from the currency in
circulation figure reported by the Federal Reserve Board to get our domestic currency-holding measure.
See Judson (2012) for a number of alternative methods to measure the stock of U.S. currency held abroad.
40
results show that cash demand is likely to depend on revolving debt behavior, and thus
be a function of both checking account interest rates and credit card interest rates. This
feature implies that changes in the credit card rate can affect social welfare by affecting
the substitution between cash and credit. More research is needed to better understand
our findings. Data limitations prevent us from exploring their effects on cash demand in
more detail. More theoretical development of the link between cash and credit decisions by
consumers is also needed to guide future applied research in this area.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper has estimated cash demand of U.S. consumers using recent data from a new,
public survey, the SCPC. The data bear out some of the predictions of inventory manage-
ment models both qualitatively and quantitatively, but there are also important differences.
Most notably the effect of interest rates on cash holdings or withdrawals (intensive mar-
gin) is smaller than predicted by the original Baumol (1952)–Tobin (1956) model, but in
line with the prediction of Alvarez and Lippi (2009). Moreover, we did not find evidence
that interest rates affect the decision to adopt interest–bearing checking accounts (extensive
margin) or credit cards. This finding is surprising in the light of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2000), which found that the extensive margin is important for the management of demand
deposits at low interest rates (see footnote 10 on how different definitions might potentially
explain this difference).
The novel result of this paper is that credit card borrowing seems to affect consumers’
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cash management practices, including the interest elasticity of cash demand. It is worth
noting that about 30–35 percent of SCPC respondents were revolving credit card debt each
year, so this effect on the welfare cost of inflation could be significant. At the same time,
the presence of nominal debt highlights the need for a general equilibrium approach to the
welfare analysis; hence, we believe that extending the Cooley and Hansen (1991), Gillman
(1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) models to include
revolving debt would be an interesting topic for future research.
Another key finding is that beyond the control variables commonly used in the cash de-
mand literature, the primary withdrawal method influences cash management significantly.
This finding shows the importance of understanding why people use certain cash withdrawal
locations, another topic for future research.
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Chapter 2
This Is What’s in Your Wallet...and
Here’s How You Use It
2.1 Introduction
A popular commercial campaign by the U.S. bank Capital One asks listeners, “What’s in
your wallet?” This paper attempts to answer this question using a panel of micro data
from the new 2012 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC). The question and answer
offers fresh insights into (i) the transformation of the U.S. money and payment system from
paper to electronics, and (ii) the effect of this transformation on liquid asset management.
These days, U.S. consumers choose to adopt, carry, and use any of nearly a dozen payment
instruments to buy goods and services.
There have been a number of recent contributions on payment instrument choice in various
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countries using transaction-level data; see, for example, Fung, Huynh, and Sabetti (2012)
for Canada; Bounie and Bouhdaoui (2012) for France; von Kalckreuth, Schmidt, and Stix
(2009) for Germany; Klee (2008) and Cohen and Rysman (2013) for the United States. In
this paper, we begin by replicating the analysis of Klee (2008) on the DCPC data. The result
shows that over the last decade payment instrument choice has undergone a remarkable
transformation: checks have virtually disappeared from point-of-sale transactions.
Second, our data allow us to analyze sequences of consumer decisions about payment
instrument choice and cash withdrawal. Hence, we can extend the existing literature on
the inventory-theoretic models of money demand, which focused on describing individuals’
optimal cash withdrawal policy assuming an exogenously given process of cash expendi-
tures (see, for example, Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956; Miller and Orr, 1966; Bar-Ilan, 1990;
Alvarez and Lippi, 2009). It seems unrealistic to assume that these models provide a good
description of the current U.S. payments system, where debit and credit card acceptance is
almost universal at check-out counters. Therefore, we propose a model where, in addition
to controlling the timing of withdrawals, agents also control how quickly they decrease their
cash holdings.
This paper builds on the model of Koulayev et al. (2012b), who analyze the adoption
and use of payment instruments. In our model, a dynamic extension of their paper, the
bundle of available instruments changes over time as consumers run out and replenish their
cash holdings. On other dimensions (for example, the adoption of payment instruments,
the correlation of the random utility terms), however, our setup is much less ambitious.
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These restrictions enable us to obtain closed-form solutions for the inventory management
problem, as in Rust (1987). (See Chapter 7.7 in Train, 2009, for a concise description.)
This framework can capture that when consumers make payments, they consider not only
the current benefits of using a particular instrument, but also the effect this choice has on
future transactions. To illustrate, take, for example, somebody with $10 in her purse, along
with a credit card, who is planning to make two low-value transactions worth $8 and $3,
respectively. Clearly, a choice to use cash for the $8 transaction will force her to either use
the credit card for the $3 transaction or to withdraw cash, which might be inconvenient.
Preliminary results show that households value cash differently depending on the bundle
of payment instruments they hold and their revolving credit balance. In particular, all
else being equal, those with outstanding balances on their credit card are 7.3 percent more
likely to use cash and 3.9 percent more likely to use debit cards to pay for median-sized
transactions than those without credit balances. We also find meaningful variation in the
estimated withdrawal costs by various withdrawal methods: It is about 18 percent more
costly to get cash from a bank teller than to use an ATM, indicating that technological
improvements are an important factor in keeping the number of cash transactions relatively
high (these represent over 40 percent of all point-of-sale transactions).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly reviews recent models that analyze
the interactions between cash inventory management and payment instrument choice. Sec-
tion 2.3 draws a quick comparison between the DCPC data and Klee (2008), and estimates
simple multinomial logit models for various types of transactions. Section 2.4 describes the
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dynamic extension of the payment instrument choice model and discusses how the model
can be solved. Section 2.5 extends that model to allow for withdrawals, linking payment
instrument choice and cash demand. Section 2.6 describes the results of the estimation,
and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
There are a number of papers that have tried to embed payment instrument choice into
money demand models: ?, Bar-Ilan (1990), and Alvarez and Lippi (2012) all allow con-
sumers to make costly credit transactions after they run out of cash. However, these models
all imply a lexicographical ordering between cash and credit —cash is used until available,
then credit— that is impossible to reconcile with the data.
Another strand of literature that analyzes different means of payment and money demand
is New-Monetarism. In an example of this strand, (Nosal and Rocheteau, 2011, Chapter
8) present a model in which consumers endogenously choose between credit and cash and
can reset their cash holdings at a fixed cost. The tractability of their model makes it an
appealing expository device of the issues we are studying and it is possible to re-interpret
our model as an extension of their model with some additional randomness (for example,
by adding random costs of using payment instruments) introduced to enable the model
to explain the transaction-level data. ? extend the Lagos and Wright (2005) model in a
different direction: By introducing a random fixed cost to making withdrawals, they are
able to study an economy with a nontrivial distribution of cash holdings. In ongoing work
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we aim to extend the current version of our model along similar lines.
In recent empirical work Klee (2008) attempted to establish a link between payment
instrument choice and money demand, but because of data limitations, was only able to
link transaction values (not cash holdings) to payment instrument choice. Eschelbach and
Schmidt (2013) find in a reduced-form estimation using German data that “the probability
of a transaction being settled in cash declines significantly as the amount of cash available
at one’s disposal decreases,” but they also fall short of explaining the link from cash use to
cash demand.
2.3 Payment instrument choice
2.3.1 Payments transformation 2001–2012
This subsection replicates the econometric analysis in Klee (2008) using the DCPC data.
First, we restrict our data to ensure that the results are comparable. The transactions
used in Klee’s estimation all come from a grocery store chain that accepted cash, check,
debit, and credit cards (signature debit was recorded as credit card payment); moreover,
she restricted her sample to transaction values between $5 and $150 (2001 dollar prices).1
The DCPC has a much broader scope: it tries to cover all consumer transactions, not just
purchases at grocery stores. In fact, it also includes information on not-in-person payments
(such as on-line purchases), bill payments, and automatic bill payments. For the results in
this subsection, we used only transactions made at grocery, pharmacy, liquor stores, and
1Note that Klee’s data are not meant to be representative of the U.S. payment system.
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convenience stores (without gas stations), where cash, check, debit, or credit card was used,2
and we kept the range of transaction values unchanged (in 2001 dollars).
As in Klee (2008), we estimate a multinomial logit model of payment instrument choice.
The choice of respondent n to use payment instrument i in transaction t depends on the
indirect utilities unti:
i∗ = argmaxi unti
unti = xtβ1i + znβ2i + nti,
where vector xt collects transaction-specific explanatory variables (for example, transac-
tion value), while vector zn denotes respondent-specific variables (for example, household
income, age, education, gender, marital status), and nti is assumed to be an independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Type I Extreme Value distributed error term. Note that
since the variables in xt and zt do not vary across payment instruments, the coefficients β
are assumed to be different for each payment instrument. The assumption about the error
terms guarantees a closed-form solution for the choice probabilities:
Pr(i|xt, zn) = exp(unti)∑
i exp(unti)
.
The variables were chosen so as to match the specification in Klee (2008) as closely as
2The DCPC also includes data on prepaid card, bank account number payment, money order, travelers’
checks, text message, and other payments. For grocery stores, however, the share transacted with these
instruments is negligible.
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Table 4
Consumer choice
Variable Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Check Credit Debit
Items bought 0.024*(0.000) 0.018*(0.000) 0.003*(0.000) 0.002*(0.000)
(Items bought)2 0.001*(0.000) 0.000*(0.000) 0.000*(0.000) 0.000*(0.000)
Value of sale 0.008*(0.000) 0.003*(0.000) 0.003*(0.000) 0.003*(0.000)
Manufacturer coupons 0.014*(0.000) 0.006*(0.000) 0.006*(0.000) 0.002*(0.000)
Day of week
Monday 0.016*(0.001) 0.024*(0.001) 0.005*(0.000) 0.013*(0.001)
Tuesday 0.029*(0.001) 0.037*(0.001) 0.006*(0.000) 0.014*(0.001)
Wednesday 0.030*(0.001) 0.041*(0.001) 0.004*(0.000) 0.015*(0.001)
Thursday 0.017*(0.001) 0.038*(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.021*(0.001)
Friday 0.022*(0.001) 0.011*(0.001) 0.006*(0.000) 0.027*(0.001)
Saturday 0.012*(0.001) 0.012*(0.001) 0.006*(0.000) 0.017*(0.000)
Median household income 0.004*(0.000) 0.009*(0.000) 0.005*(0.000) 0.018*(0.000)
Age
35–44 0.281*(0.009) 0.029*(0.007) 0.074*(0.005) 0.236*(0.006)
45–54 0.300*(0.010) 0.260*(0.008) 0.181*(0.005) 0.378*(0.006)
55–64 0.269*(0.011) 0.484*(0.008) 0.495*(0.006) 0.258*(0.008)
65–74 1.080*(0.011) 0.332*(0.008) 0.554*(0.006) 0.858*(0.008)
Education
High school 0.309*(0.009) 0.018*(0.007) 0.077*(0.006) 0.249*(0.007)
Some college 0.514*(0.004) 0.065*(0.003) 0.207*(0.002) 0.372*(0.003)
College 0.474*(0.005) 0.170*(0.004) 0.393*(0.003) 0.251*(0.004)
Married 0.466*(0.006) 0.115*(0.004) 0.249*(0.004) 0.102*(0.004)
Female-headed household 0.341*(0.011) 0.595*(0.008) 0.075*(0.007) 0.180*(0.008)
Urban 0.068*(0.001) 0.039*(0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.030*(0.001)
Owner-occupied 0.055*(0.003) 0.084*(0.003) 0.098*(0.002) 0.042*(0.002)
Pseudo R-squared 0.117
Observations 6,204,845
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Fig. 5. Predicted probabilities.
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Figure 2.1: Payment instrument choice at grocery stores in 2001 (left, from Klee (2008))
and 2012 (right)
possible.3
Figure 2.1 compares the estimated payment choice probabilities at different transaction
values in 2001 and 2012. The left panel is taken from Klee (2008), while the right panel is
obtained by carrying out the estimation on the DCPC data. The most striking difference
between the two panels is that checks have virtually disappeared from grocery stores over the
past decade. Second, the probability of choosing cash has roughly halved at all transaction
values and cash is used overwhelmingly for low-value transactions. Credit and debit cards
have stepped into the void left by the decline of cash for low-value transactions and checks for
larger-value transactions. In particular, while the choice probability for PIN debit (orange
dash-dotted line) levels off at large transaction values, credit (including signature debit)
increases monotonically over this range of purchases.
3We have no information on the number of items bought and whether the respondent used a manufacturer’s
coupon to get a discount, nor do we have information on whether the respondent resides in an urban or
rural area and whether or not she is a homeowner.
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2.3.2 Payment instrument use in different contexts
In this subsection we drop the data restrictions in the previous subsection imposed by the
need for comparability and re-do the same estimations on the broad range of payment
contexts covered in the DCPC. The qualitative results from Figure 2.1 carry over to more
general settings. For example, checks are largely absent from daily purchase transactions.4
Cash transactions play a significant role in low-value in-person transactions, but, for obvious
reasons, they are absent in not-in-person transactions.
Figure 2.2 shows payment instrument choice probabilities by transaction values. For in-
person transactions (left panel) the graph tells a story similar to the one for grocery stores
only (note that the scales of both axes have changed). Checks are rather unimportant; the
change in the probability of cash use between low- and high-value transactions is by far the
greatest among all payment instruments, although credit card use increases fairly quickly
and does not level off even at transaction values as high as $1,000.
Unlike the studies that rely on scanner data, we are able to separate signature debit
transactions from credit card transactions.5 This is important, because according to Fig-
ure 2.2 signature debit transactions are very similar to PIN debit transactions, and quite
different from credit transactions. There is not much difference between the two types of
debit cards, although PIN debit use seems to level off at somewhat higher transaction val-
ues. This suggests, not surprisingly, that when making a payment, consumers are primarily
4They still play a role in bill payments, which we do not analyze in this paper.
5Scanner datasets record the network through which transactions are routed by the merchant, not the
actual payment instrument that consumers use.
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Figure 2.2: Payment instrument choice at the point-of-sale (left) and not-in-person (right)
concerned with the funds that debit and credit cards tap into; therefore, grouping payment
methods by the network through which they are cleared may be misleading. The increase
in the “Other” category as the transaction value increases is largely the result of a few fairly
high-value purchases made using money order. Since there are few large-value transactions
(the 99th percentile is at $341), these are a nontrivial portion of all large transactions.
Not-in-person purchases are dominated by credit and signature debit card payments,
while bank account number payments (subsumed in the ”Other” category) represent about
10 percent of all not-in-person transactions.
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2.4 Dynamic model of consumer payment choice
The goal of our paper is to estimate a joint model of cash management and payment
instrument choice. For expositional purposes, we think it is easier to present the model in
two steps: First, we describe the problem of a consumer who has a set amount of cash and
has to make payment choices that respect the cash-in-advance constraint, but cannot make
withdrawals. This will be done in the current section. Then, in Section 2.5, we extend this
model, to give consumers a chance to change cash holdings, by making withdrawals.
In general, all types of payments, not just cash, are subject to constraints similar to
the cash-in-advance constraint we focus on in this paper. Consumers may have minimum
balance requirements on their checking account, or be up against their borrowing limit on
their credit cards. Ideally, we would like to have a model that captures the availability
of all payment instruments, but we do not have information about these other types of
constraints. At the same time, we expect the cash-in-advance constraint to be the one that
is most frequently binding.
2.4.1 The dynamic problem
Given that the availability of one of the payment instruments, cash, changes when it is used
in a transaction, a link exists between current and future transactions: Choosing to use cash
now, may limit the choice set in future transactions. Following Koulayev et al. (2012b),
we model this by stipulating that if cash balances are insufficient to settle a transaction,
the consumer will no longer be able to take advantage of a (potentially) high realization
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of the random utility associated with cash transactions and therefore her expected utilities
associated with future transactions will be lower. A forward-looking consumer will take
into account this potential loss of utility when making the payment instrument choice in
the current transaction. That is, she would maximize
V (mt, t) = max
it∈{h,c,d}
uindt + E [V (mt+1, t+ 1)]
uindt = βixndt + γxni + ndti = δndti + ndti,
where V (mt, t) denotes the value of having mt amount of cash before making the tth trans-
action, and E[.] is the mathematical expectation operator taken over the realizations of
the shocks affecting future transactions. The instantaneous utility from using a payment
instrument has three parts. Some variables xndt differ only across individuals (n) or days
(d) or transactions (t), but not across payment instruments (i). Demographic variables and
transaction values would be the obvious examples. For these variables, separate coefficients
(βi) will have to be estimated for each payment instrument. Other explanatory variables are
specific to a payment instrument (for example, whether a credit card gives rewards) and are
included in the indirect utility function only for that instrument. For these variables, only
a single parameter is estimated and these are collected in γ. The deterministic part of the
indirect utility βixndt+γxni will be denoted by δndti. Finally, there is a random component
of the utility distributed independently and identically Type I generalized extreme value.
The n and d subscripts will be dropped in what follows. The consumer chooses between
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credit, debit, and cash (if she has enough of it to pay for the tth transaction, mt ≥ pt).
The evolution of m is given by
mt+1 = mt − pt · I(it = h),
where I is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if cash is chosen (i = h) and 0
otherwise. The program has a finite number of “periods” (transactions) T , which is known
to the consumer, and can be solved by evaluating the expectation on the right-hand side
from the last period backwards.
Note that we assume throughout the model that the consumer knows with certainty at
the beginning of the day, not only the number of transactions that she will make, but also
the deterministic part δndti of the indirect utility for each of these transactions. Although
there are some variables in δndti, such as the demographic characteristics, for which this
information structure seems reasonable, assuming that the consumer knows exactly the
dollar value of each transaction is clearly an extreme assumption.
To start the backward iteration, we need to fix the value of having an amount m of cash
left after the last transaction (the terminal value of the value function). For simplicity, for
now, assume that there is no value to carrying cash after the last transaction, resulting in
V (mT , T ) =

maxi∈{h,c,d} uiT if mT ≥ pT
maxi∈{c,d} uiT if mT < pT
,
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that is, the continuation value after transaction T is 0, regardless of the amount of cash
on hand after the final transaction of the day. Note that given the simplifying assumption
about the value of end-of-day cash holdings, the last period collapses to the multinomial
logit choice problem, with expected utilities given by
E[V (mT , T )] =

ln
(∑
i∈{h,c,d} exp(δT i)
)
+ γ if mT ≥ pT
ln
(∑
i∈{c,d} exp(δT i)
)
+ γ if mT < pT
, (2.1)
just as in the static case of Section 2.3.
2.4.2 Transaction T − 1
This means that, iterating backwards, the choice problem for T − 1 is
V (mT−1, T − 1) =
maxi∈{h,c,d} uiT−1 + E [V (mT−1 − pT−1 · I(iT−1 = h), T )] if mT−1 ≥ pT−1
maxi∈{c,d} uiT−1 + E [V (mT−1, T )] if mT−1 < pT−1
.
(2.2)
While this function looks complicated, it is not hard to evaluate. Given mT−1 we know
which of the two branches in equation (2.2) is relevant.
Insufficient cash for the current transaction, mT−1 < pT−1
Starting with the simpler case, assume that mT−1 < pT−1, meaning that: (i) in the current
period only debit or credit can be chosen and therefore (ii) mT = mT−1. From (ii) we
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know which branch of E [V (mT , T )] in equation (2.1) is the relevant one, so all the terms
in equation (2.2) are known and the choice probability of, for example, credit, will given by
Pr (iT−1 = c|mT−1 < pT−1) =
exp
(
δcT−1 + E [V (mT−1, T )]
)
exp
(
δcT−1 + E [V (mT−1, T )]
)
+ exp
(
δdT−1 + E [V (mT−1, T )]
) ,
which collapses to the logit choice probability, since the expected utility terms for period
T added to the δT−1s are the same and they all appear additively in the argument of the
exp(.) operator, that is
Pr(iT−1 =c|mT−1 < pT−1) =
exp(δcT−1) ·((((((
((((exp (E [V (mT−1, T )])
exp(δcT−1) ·((((((
((((exp (E [V (mT−1, T )]) + exp(δdT−1) ·((((((
((((exp (E [V (mT−1, T )])
=
exp(δcT−1)
exp(δcT−1) + exp(δ
d
T−1)
.
(2.3)
It is worth keeping this simple and intuitive principle in mind: Dynamic considerations
affect payment instrument choice only if the current choice reduces the expected utility when
conducting the next transaction. In this model, card use cannot do that.6 The probability
for debit card use will be analogous.
6In reality, it could be the case that checking account balances drop to levels where they cannot be used,
or that consumers max out their credit card(s). Unfortunately, we do not have data on that.
56
Cash is an option in T − 1, mT−1 ≥ pT−1
Going back to equation (2.2), ifmT−1 ≥ pT−1, then next period’s expected utility, E [V (mT , T )],
will be a bit more complicated to compute, since there are two possible values for mT ,
depending on the payment instrument choice in the current transaction. With some prob-
ability cash will be chosen now, in which case mT = mT−1 − pT−1; otherwise mT = mT−1.
Hence,
E [V (mT , T )] = Pr(iT−1 = h) · E [V (mT−1 − pT−1, T )] +
(1− Pr(iT−1 = h)) · E [V (mT−1, T )] .
The expected value terms can be readily evaluated using equation (2.1), so all that needs
to be calculated is the probability of using cash in the current transaction, which is given
by a formula analogous to equation (2.3),
Pr(iT−1 = h|mT−1 ≥ pT−1) =
exp(δhT−1 + E [V (mT−1 − pT−1, T )])
exp(δhT−1 + E [V (mT−1 − pT−1, T )]) +
∑
j=c,d exp(δ
j
T−1 + E [V (mT−1, T )])
.
(2.4)
Note the new first term in the denominator (the terms referring to credit and debit have
been collapsed into a summation). Since cash can now be chosen in period T −1, debit and
credit probabilities will decrease somewhat; hence the appearance of the new term.
Importantly, however, the formula reveals that the continuation utility after choosing
cash may be different than the continuation utility after choosing cards. In particular, the
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first argument of E [V (., T )] is now mT−1 − pT−1 if cash is chosen in T − 1, whereas it is
mT−1 if cards are used in period T − 1. This is how consumers account for the fact that
cash use now may limit their choices in the following transaction.
However, the principle stated above still applies: If (i) the consumer has enough cash to
make both the (T − 1)th and the T th transaction with cash (mT−1 ≥ pT−1 + pT ) or (ii)
if she would not have enough cash to pay for the T th transaction even if she did not use
cash for transaction T − 1 (mT−1 < pT ), then there is no effect of the payment instrument
choice in T − 1 on the value function in T . This argument extends to more transactions:
If (i) mt ≥
∑T
s=t ps or (ii) mt < mins{ps}Ts=t+1, then the expected utilities in the formulas
will be the same and the choice probabilities will collapse to the logit probabilities.7
Thus, we have demonstrated that the terms E [V (mT−1 − pT−1 · I(iT−1 = h), T )] and
E [V (mT−1, T )] can be computed from functions that are readily known; hence, we are
again left with the task of computing the choice probabilities in transaction T − 2, given
mT−2 using equation (2.4), and we can continue the recursion all the way up to the first
transaction.
2.5 Incorporating withdrawals
The dynamic model of Section 2.4 can be used to calculate the benefits of having a certain
amount of cash on hand. The goal of this section is to use that information and data on
7Checking whether either of these special cases does in fact hold speeds up the evaluation of the expected
utility tremendously for consumers who make many transactions a day.
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withdrawals to estimate the costs associated with obtaining cash in order to characterize
cash demand.
2.5.1 Simple model of withdrawals
Despite the availability of a closed-form solution for the dynamic model of Section 2.4, the
evaluation of the value functions is computationally involved for individuals who report more
than five transactions in a day and have an intermediate level of cash holdings. Therefore,
we propose a simple model for withdrawals.
Consumers start the day with an exogenously given amount of cash. Before every purchase
transaction they can decide whether they want to withdraw cash first. If they choose to
do so, we assume that they withdraw enough cash to possibly settle all their remaining
transactions with cash. That is, we assume, for now, that there is no variable cost of carrying
cash within the day and that there is no limit on how much cash they can withdraw (clearly,
a simplifying assumption for cashbacks). The fixed cost of making a withdrawal and the lack
of a carrying/holding cost implies that consumers will make at most one withdrawal during
the day; moreover, they have no reason to make a withdrawal after the last point-of-sale
transaction.
Formally, if a consumer decides to make a withdrawal before transaction t, her new cash
balances will be mt = m¯t ≡
∑T
s=t ps. The cost of making a withdrawal is modeled as
cndjt = αznd + αj + jt,
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where znd is a vector of consumer- and day-specific explanatory variables, αj is a with-
drawal method-specific fixed-effect, and the jt follow independent Type I extreme value
distributions.
The consumer’s choice before each transaction is given by,
E[W(mt, t, wt = 0)] =

E [V (m¯t, t, wt+1 = 1)]− cjt if Iwjt = 1
E [V (mt, t, wt+1 = 0)] if
∑
j Iwjt = 0
, (2.5)
where Iwjt is an indicator function for withdrawals (1 if a withdrawal is made using method
j, 0 otherwise), where at most one of the Iwjts might be bigger than 0. Note that due to the
one-withdrawal-per-day limit, wt+1 = wt +
∑
j Iwjt is a new state variable: If a withdrawal
was made earlier in the day, consumers do not have the option (nor the need) to make
additional withdrawals, since they will be able to make all payments using cash. On the
other hand, if they have not used up their withdrawal opportunity, then, in the current or
in any one of the future transactions they may do so.
Formally,
E [V (m¯t, t, wt+1 = 1)] = max
i∈{h,c,d}
uit + E [V (mt − pt · I(it = h), t+ 1, wt+2 = 1)] ,
with mt =
∑T
s=t ps, meaning that the choice probabilities will not be affected by the cash-
in-advance constraint, since it will not bind in the remaining transactions. Also, since the
withdrawal opportunity has already been used, the continuation value is given by E[V (.)],
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not E[W (.)].
The more computationally involved part will be the evaluation of
E [V (mt, t, wt+1 = 0)] = max
i∈{h,c,d}
uit + E [W(mt − pt · I(it = h), t+ 1, wt+2 = 0)] ,
where the possibility of a future withdrawal will have to be included at each future transac-
tion. However, the backward iteration described in Section 2.4 will still work in principle,
with appropriate modifications. In particular, the random components of the withdrawal
costs have been chosen to still yield closed-form solutions, similar to the payment instrument
choice problem.
2.6 Results
The model is estimated by choosing parameters (α, β, γ) to maximize the likelihood of
observing the sequence of payment instrument and withdrawal choices.
logL(˜i, j˜;α, β, γ) =
∑
n
∑
d
∑
t
(
log(Pr(j˜ndt)) + log(Pr(˜indt))
)
,
where i˜, j˜ denote the observed payment instrument and withdrawal method choices in the
data. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 2.1.
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Chapter 2 This Is What’s in Your Wallet...and Here’s How You Use It
Indirect utilities
Debit card Credit card
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -0.3199∗∗∗ 0.1286 -1.4100∗∗∗ 0.1738
TransVal 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0013
SmallVal -0.7305∗∗∗ 0.0709 -1.0894∗∗∗ 0.0834
HHIncome -0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000
Age -0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0019 -0.0033 0.0023
Weekend 0.0809 0.0559 0.0660 0.0688
Female 0.0309 0.0568 -0.2688∗∗∗ 0.0679
PayDay 0.1933∗ 0.1003 0.0598 0.1237
RewardDC 0.0863 0.0613
Revolver -1.0980∗∗∗ 0.0671
RewardCC 1.2236∗∗∗ 0.0965
Withdrawal costs
Variable Coeff. S.E.
IntRate -0.0045 0.0171
HHIncome 0.0000 0.0000
Employed 0.2409∗ 0.1342
PayDay -0.7755∗∗∗ 0.1866
Withdrawal methods
ATM 4.4392∗∗∗ 0.1547
Cashback 6.0196∗∗∗ 0.2160
Bankteller 5.2709∗∗∗ 0.1777
Family & friends 4.8565∗∗∗ 0.1642
Other 5.0976∗∗∗ 0.1715
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.1: Estimated coefficients
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Marginal effects
Cash Debit Credit
TransVal -0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
Under $10r 0.1977∗∗∗ -0.1003∗∗∗ -0.0974∗∗∗
HHIncome -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗
Age 0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0000
Weekend -0.0180 0.0136 0.0044
Female 0.0209∗ 0.0162 -0.0371∗∗∗
Payday -0.0290 0.0323 -0.0033
RewardDC -0.0145 0.0193 -0.0048
Revolver 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ -0.1117∗∗∗
RewardCC -0.1626∗∗∗ -0.0857∗∗∗ 0.2483∗∗∗
For dummy variables, marginal effect is a change from
0 to 1. TransVal=$12.53, income, age at sample average.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.2: Marginal effects for the final transaction on a day
2.6.1 Marginal effects
The marginal effects are reported in Table 2.2. As noted earlier, there is a close connection
between the multinominal choice model and our dynamic specification: When continuation
values across the three payment instruments are equal, the dynamic model collapses into the
multinomial model. By assumption, the continuation values after the final transaction of a
day are equal across payment instruments (they are all set to zero). Therefore, to facilitate
comparison with previous results in the literature, we computed the marginal effects implied
by our estimates for a hypothetical consumer (of average age, earning average income, and
with all other variables set to zero) for her final transaction of a day. The main difference
from Klee (2008) is that the effect of transaction values on cash use drops to about a
quarter of what Klee found. Part of the explanation is obviously the inclusion of a dummy
63
variable for small-value transactions, a choice that was motivated by the fact that some
merchants accept only cash for small transactions. The other reason is that our dynamic
framework controls explicitly for one of the main reasons transaction values might matter:
the cash-in-advance constraint.
Moreover, the individual-level data show that other factors are just as important: Re-
volvers are much less likely to use credit cards than convenience users. On the other hand,
credit card reward programs appear to be highly effective in steering consumers toward
credit card use. Interestingly, debit card reward programs do not have the same effect.
2.6.2 Are consumers forward-looking?
Our model and the rest of the literature on payment choice can be thought of as addressing
two extremes: We endow consumers with a great deal of information about their future
transactions while the rest of the literature thinks of them as completely myopic. How
important is this difference empirically? The simplest way to answer this question is to
compare the choice probabilities of the two models. As noted before, the choice probabilities
for the final transaction coincide with that of a multinomial logit model, but they may differ
if the consumer plans to conduct more transactions.
Table 2.3 compares the payment instrument choice probabilities for the first transaction of
the day for different total numbers of daily transactions. The same hypothetical consumer as
in the previous subsection is assumed to start the day with $20, and all daily transactions
are assumed to be for $12.53 (the median transaction value). Table 2.3 shows that the
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Daily Choice probabilities∗
transactions Cash Debit Credit
1 0.4070 0.2397 0.3533
2 0.2947 0.2851 0.4202
3 0.2289 0.3117 0.4595
4 0.1827 0.3303 0.4870
5 0.1484 0.3442 0.5074
∗Dummy variables set to 1, except for “Under$10”.
TransVal=$12.53, income, age at sample average.
Table 2.3: Choice probabilities for the first daily transaction for different total numbers of
transactions
model predicts rather different choice probabilities in the five scenarios. In particular, the
probability of using cash drops from 40 percent in the case of a single transaction, to just
below 30 percent if she makes only one additional transaction. The drop in the probability
of using cash is monotonic; in the case of a third transaction it is only roughly half what it
would otherwise be. Since our choice model (like other multinomial logit models) possesses
the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives property, the relative probabilities of debit and
credit do not change.
2.6.3 Withdrawal costs
Given the estimates of α, αj , β, γ, the model can be used to conduct a cost-benefit analysis
of cash withdrawals. In particular, given αˆ and αˆj , we compute the average withdrawal
cost by withdrawal methods in our sample:
c¯j =
∑
n
∑
d αˆznd + αj
Nj
,
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Relative to
Method ∆EV DC ∆EV D ∆EV C c¯ATM
ATM 5.57 4.34 2.84 1.00
Cashback 7.51 5.85 3.82 1.35
Bank teller 6.59 5.13 3.35 1.18
Family & friend 6.08 4.74 3.10 1.09
Other 6.38 4.97 3.25 1.15
Table 2.4: Withdrawal costs
where the denominator is the number of observed withdrawals using method j in the sam-
ple. This gives us a measure in units of consumer utility, which has no natural unit of
measurement. To get a sense of the size of withdrawal costs, we compare them with the
expected benefit of having cash, defined as:
∆EV = E
[
V (pmdT , 0, T )
]
− E [V (0, 0, T )] ,
that is, the change in the expected utilities from making a payment of $12.53 for the
hypothetical consumer of the previous subsections. In fact, we compute this difference for
debit and credit card holders (∆EV DC), debit card holders who do not have a credit card
(∆EV D), and credit card holders who do not own a debit card (∆EV C).
Table 2.4 shows that, depending on the withdrawal method, it takes anywhere from 6
to 8 (median-sized) transactions to recoup the average withdrawal cost for consumers who
have a debit card and a credit card (with no debt). For those who can only use a debit
card instead of cash, withdrawals are less costly (cash is more useful): it takes them 4 to 6
(median-sized) transactions to make up for the withdrawal cost. Those with only a credit
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card recoup these same costs in 3–4 transactions.
The table also shows that ATM withdrawals are the least expensive, in utility terms,
followed by getting cash from family and friends, other sources (including employers, check-
cashing stores, cash refunds from returning goods, and unspecified locations), bank tellers,
and retail store cash back. The difference between the least expensive and the most expen-
sive source is about 35 percent.
2.6.4 Withdrawals
The solution to inventory theoretic models of cash demand (Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956),
Alvarez and Lippi (2009)) is an (s, S) policy function, which specifies a level of cash balances
s at which cash holdings are reset to S. As discussed above, consumers in our model do
not optimize the size of their withdrawals, they withdraw just enough cash to carry them
through the day. Therefore, a straightforward comparison between our model and the
inventory theoretic studies does not exist. We can, however, compute the probability that
someone makes a withdrawal before a particular transaction.
Figure 2.3 depicts these probabilities for consumers with different payment instruments
in their portfolio. The hypothetical scenario behind the graph is that a consumer (aver-
age income, average age, employed, male) knows that he will have to make two, $12.50
transactions during the day. The horizontal axis denotes different amounts of cash in his
wallet before the withdrawal opportunity preceding the first transaction, and the vertical
axis denotes the probability that he will make a $25 withdrawal before the first transaction.
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The different lines correspond to different bundles of available payment instruments.
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Figure 2.3: Withdrawal probabilities with different payment instrument bundles
The solid line denotes the extreme case, where no credit or debit card is available to the
consumer; therefore, he will have to make a withdrawal before the first transaction if he
has less than $12.50 in his wallet. If he has more than that, he can afford to wait with the
withdrawal until after the first transaction. Note that withdrawal costs also have a random
component, so there is an option value of waiting. Figure 2.3 shows that consumers will
use this option half the time. Finally, if he already has $25 or more in his pocket, there is
no reason to get more cash.
The withdrawal decisions follow similar step-functions for every other payment instrument
68
bundle. What stands out from the graph is that a person who revolves credit card debt
and has no debit card (shown by squares) also values cash highly and is very likely to make
a withdrawal if he is low on cash (< $12.50). The option to delay a withdrawal, if he
has enough cash (≥$12.50) appears more valuable than for somebody with no alternative
payment instrument, as indicated by the precipitous drop in the withdrawal probability.
Since withdrawals are quite expensive, having just one additional option to complete a
transaction already reduces the need for a withdrawal, especially if the benefits of the
withdrawal (an expanded bundle of available payment instruments) can only be enjoyed in
one additional transaction.
A similar line of reasoning explains why a convenience user of credit cards (shown by
circles) will be not very likely to incur the cost of a withdrawal, even if his or her cash
balances are low before the first transaction. Debit card users without a credit card (shown
by stars), are even less likely to make a withdrawal, suggesting that debit cards are a closer
substitutes for cash payments (at least at lower values) than credit cards are.
2.6.5 Shadow value of cash
Another way to measure the usefulness of cash, suggested by the monetary economics
literature, is to compute the shadow value of cash, denoted by λ. This measures the change
in utility from relaxing the cash-in-advance constraint by an infinitesimal amount. We
measure it by adding ∆$ = $1, $5, $12.53 to the beginning-of-day cash holdings of each
individual on each day and we compute the average of the resulting changes in expected
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utilities
λ∆$ = E [W (mnd + ∆$, t = 1, w1 = 0)]− E [W (mnd, t = 1, w1 = 0)] ,
where mnd is the actual amount of cash respondents had at the beginning of the day.
Again, the same concept of ∆EV is used to normalize λ. That is, we normalize the average
estimated benefits of adding ∆$ dollars of cash to all consumers’ beginning-of-day payment
instrument bundles, by the expected utility that expanding the payment instrument bundle
from {debit, credit} to {∆$, debit, credit} would give for a single ∆$ transaction.
λ$1
∆EV DC
∼ 0.0164
λ$5
∆EV DC
∼ 0.1117
λ$12.53
∆EV DC
∼ 0.2892.
The costless relaxation of every consumer’s budget constraint by the median transaction
amount ($12.53) yields on average about a quarter of the expected utility of increasing
the payment instrument choice set from debit and credit to cash, debit, and credit of the
hypothetical consumer of subsection 2.6.3. The fact that this number is much lower than
1 suggests that a number of people in our sample are either already able to use cash for all
of their transactions or only make transactions larger than $12.53; so for them the shadow
value is zero. (Of course, doing away with the restriction of zero continuation value at the
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end of the day would change this.)
2.6.6 Simulations
Table 2.5 displays various moments in our data and shows how well the model replicates
them. We considered several scenarios, the results for all of them based on 1,000 independent
simulations.
First, to get an idea of how well the model explains the data, we ran a simulation of
the model with the estimated parameters. Shocks were drawn according to the specified
distributions, and the exogenous beginning-of-the-day cash balances were set to the values
observed in the data (“DCPC starting cash”). Comparing the first two lines of the upper
panel of the table shows that the model does fairly well in capturing the payment instrument
choices. While the share of cash payments is somewhat underpredicted (46.57 percent vs.
49.9 percent in the data) and, correspondingly, debit and are credit overpredicted, the
differences are fairly small.
On the other hand, the model performs much worse with withdrawals, a result that is
not entirely surprising given our simplistic framework. Comparing the first two lines of the
bottom panel of Table 2.5 shows that instead of the 479 withdrawals in the data, the model
is able to predict only 304. We suspect three reasons for this. First, since the continuation
value at the end of the day is set to zero and most individuals do not make more than two
daily transactions, the high cost of withdrawals becomes prohibitive unless a very favorable
shock is drawn. Second, we assume that agents start the day with an exogenous stock of
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Payment instrument choice
Cash Debit card Credit card
Data 0.4990 0.2906 0.2104
Simulation
DCPC starting cash 0.4657 0.3131 0.2212
$0 starting cash 0.2232 0.4567 0.3201
Simulation—No ATM
DCPC starting cash 0.4589 0.3180 0.2231
$0 starting cash 0.1978 0.4729 0.3293
Simulation—Very Costly W
DCPC starting cash 0.4175 0.3492 0.2333
$0 starting cash 0.0066 0.6004 0.3930
Withdrawals
Number Share of methods
ATM Cashback Bank teller Fam. & fr. Other
Data 479 0.3549 0.0731 0.1545 0.2338 0.1837
Simulation
DCPC starting cash 304 0.4863 0.0155 0.1052 0.2418 0.1513
$0 starting cash 824 0.4679 0.0182 0.1121 0.2442 0.1576
Simulation—No ATM
DCPC starting cash 246 0 0.0427 0.2172 0.4433 0.2967
$0 starting cash 707 0 0.0485 0.2228 0.4314 0.2972
Simulation—Very Costly W
DCPC starting cash 2 0.2115 0.1895 0.1905 0.2050 0.2035
$0 starting cash 35 0.1989 0.2019 0.1991 0.2010 0.1991
Table 2.5: Simulation results
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cash, for which they do not have to pay. Therefore, many of them are able to make cash
payments without making a withdrawal. Finally, of the 1,722 individuals in our sample, only
19 report not having a debit or credit card, meaning that the majority of the households
are able to transact even without cash.
To understand better the role of the beginning-of-the-day cash balances, we re-ran the
simulations with each consumer’s beginning-of-day cash balances set to zero (”$0 starting
cash”). This leads to a considerable drop in cash payments: 22.32 percent versus 46.57
percent in the previous simulation. These simulations yield many more cash withdrawals
than in the data (824 versus 479), but the distribution across withdrawal methods is rather
similar to the ”DCPC starting cash” simulation. Both simulations overpredict ATM with-
drawals at the expense of, for the most part, bank teller and cashback. Since cashbacks
work differently in real life than the other methods, they require a preceeding debit payment
and since we have not explicitly modeled this, it is no surprise that the prediction is off.
The bank teller result is more discouraging.
A potential use of a structural model is to run policy experiments. The particular exper-
iment we had in mind was to remove the possibility of ATM withdrawals (technically, we
made ATM withdrawals very costly). That is, we asked what cash use would look like today
had ATMs not been invented. The answer can be found in the ”Simulation—No ATM”
sections of each panel in Table 2.5. Surprisingly, cash use does not change much in either
model compared with the respective baseline simulations: Cash use drops by less than a
percentage point in the model with the observed starting cash balances and by about 2.5
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percentage points in the model with $0 starting cash balances. The number of withdrawals
drops by about a sixth in both simulations, and “Family and friends” become the primary
source of cash. This highlights the partial equilibrium nature of our model: Where would
family members and friends acquire this much additional cash?
Finally, to verify some of the above conjectures about what could be wrong with the
model, we ran another experiment, where all withdrawal methods were made very expensive.
In this case, the share of cash transactions dropped to 41.75 percent and 0.66 percent in the
two simulations. This result confirms that the exogenous starting cash balances drive the
results to a very large extent. Interestingly, even with the extremely high withdrawal cost
in these scenarios, withdrawals do not disappear from the economy. The two withdrawals
reported on the penultimate line of the bottom panel of Table 2.5 show that of the 19
respondents who had no debit or credit card there were two days when the exogenous
starting cash balances were not able to cover the spending during those days. In these cases
respondents are forced to make a withdrawal, regardless of the costs. Moreover, these 19
respondents recorded payments on 35 days, so when their beginning-of-day cash balances
are set to $0, they all have to make withdrawals on these days regardless of the withdrawal
costs. The roughly uniform distribution across withdrawal methods shows that the random
component of the cost drives this choice; the known components are equal(ly high).
All in all, the results of these simulations are mixed. On one hand, the model yields
reasonable predictions for payment instrument choice, which is encouraging, but the sim-
plistic framework for withdrawals clearly hinders it from providing a clear link between
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cash withdrawals and payment instrument choice. Future work will be directed toward
extending the model so that it is able to explain observed withdrawal amounts, not just
frequencies. This will help relax the assumption of only one withdrawal a day. Perhaps even
more restrictive in the current formulation is that of the zero end-of-day continuation value.
This was originally motivated by computational considerations: evaluating long sequences
of transactions is still quite slow. A solution to this can be introducing a change in the
information structure of the model: Not giving consumers full information about future
transaction-specific variables enables us to recast the finite period model into an infinite
horizon model. Solving for the value function in that model is more involved, however.
2.7 Conclusion
Using a new, transaction-level dataset of consumer payment choice, we are able to further
our understanding of how consumers prefer to settle transactions. First, payment instru-
ment bundles matter: Whether consumers earn rewards on their credit cards or pay interest
on credit affects their choices markedly. Second, technology matters: Even in the simple
model of this paper, we see substantial differences in the cost of obtaining cash. Third,
payment instrument choice is ultimately a dynamic decision: Using an instrument for a
transaction may limit its availability for future transactions. While much of monetary eco-
nomics has focused on analyzing the optimal withdrawal policy that helps agents transact
at minimal cost, an alternative margin that consumers can exploit in liquid asset manage-
ment is payment instrument choice. As financial innovation blurs the boundary between
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transactions and savings accounts, this margin is likely to become even more important.
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Chapter 3
Consumer Bankruptcy Protection as
Insurance against Business Cycles
3.1 Introduction
Estimates of the welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations are usually found to be small,
Lucas (1987) for example put it at 0.008 percent of aggregate consumption. An estimate
of up to 1 percent in consumption equivalents is derived from a model with incomplete
asset markets and long-term unemployment by Krusell et al. (2009), though Imrohoruglu
(1989), Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Reiter (2012) find smaller
welfare gains in incomplete asset market models. The benefit of eliminating business cycles
in these models comes predominantly from reducing the variation in the marginal utility of
consumption of the poorest agents, though the exact policy measure that achieves this is
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usually left unspecified. In reality, many countries have some form of bankruptcy protection
scheme in place that enables the most unfortunate to avoid consumption disasters. The goal
of this paper is to quantify the effect of such schemes on consumer welfare.
Figure 3.1 updates a similar graph in Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2004) with some recent
data points. The top panel depicts per-capita non-business bankruptcy filings in the United
States along with NBER recessions (shaded areas), showing that an increasing number
of consumers default when the economy enters a recession.1 The bottom panel of the
figure depicts the same series after de-trending it with the HP-filter along with the cyclical
component of the unemployment rate (dotted line), showing that the two series tend to
move together. Their correlation is computed in Table 3.1: For all sub-periods, there is
a significant positive correlation of around 0.4. The much higher correlation coefficients
in the most recent part of the sample are likely an artifact, as the recent tightening of the
bankruptcy regulations coincided with the end of the expansion before the Great Recession.2
Period Corr(ut−1, Defaultt) Corr(ut, Defaultt) Corr(ut+1, Defaultt)
1980:Q1–2013:Q2 0.4414 0.4511 0.3896
1990:Q1–2013:Q2 0.4965 0.5151 0.4752
1980:Q1–2004:Q4 0.3966 0.3715 0.2322
2006:Q1–2013:Q2 0.7818 0.7706 0.6993
Table 3.1: Correlation of unemployment and bankruptcy filings (HP-filtered series)
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) also noted the correlation between unemploy-
1There is also a clear, increasing trend in the number of filings until a change in the bankruptcy laws in
October of 2005, which has been the subject of many papers in the literature, see for example Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2010).
2Moreover, the end of the HP-filtered series may also have trouble separating trend movements from cyclical
ones.
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Source: Haver, Administrative Office of the United States Courts
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Figure 3.1: Non-business bankruptcy filings in the U.S. 1980–2013
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ment and defaults and reported that two-thirds of the bankruptcy filings were due to job
related reasons and that the unemployment rate among the bankrupt was three times the
national average. These observations indicate that consumers use bankruptcy protection as
an insurance agains business cycle fluctuation. A natural question, then, is how good this
insurance is? As the overview of the recent literature on the welfare effects of bankruptcy in
the following section highlights, the answer to this question depends crucially on the details
of model used to make the evaluation. The main contribution of this paper is to account
for the business cycle fluctuations in the probability of unemployment.
Simulations of the model show that enabling consumer default leads to a welfare loss
equivalent to 7.7 percent of consumption in the economy without the default option. Bankruptcy
does, in fact, help the poorest households smooth their consumption plans a great deal, but
as Li and Sarte (2006) pointed out the effects do not end here. The decrease in consump-
tion risk brings about a change in agents willingness to self-insure, resulting in lower net
savings, and hence capital, in the economy. This leads to lower wages and higher interest
rates, leaving agents in the middle of the wealth distribution, who’s main source of income
is labor, worse off. The top of the asset distribution benefits due to the higher interest rates.
While there has been a number of quantitative analyses of the U.S. bankruptcy regime
(see Section 3.2) only three of these models allowed for business cycle fluctuations. The
objective of Gordon (2013) is the closest to mine, he introduces aggregate fluctuations into
a life-cycle model to analyze the welfare consequences of bankruptcy. The main difference
is that he does not explicitly model unemployment, the aggregate shocks shift hours worked
80
for each agent. In contrast, in my paper it is precisely the extended unemployment spell
that leads to defaulting.
Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2004) use a model that is closely related to the one presented
here to study the effects of defaulting on business cycle fluctuations. In other words, their
focus is the opposite of mine. The papers also differ in their specification of individual’s
income process: Following Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012) I allow for both permanent
and temporary income shocks to affect consumers’ income. There are two reasons why this
is important. First, as noted in Athreya and Simpson (2006), the incentives for consump-
tion smoothing through borrowing are rather different when permanent income shocks are
present: Without a default option consumers may refrain from borrowing altogether, fearing
that a large negative permanent income shock in the future would force them to decrease
their consumption to potentially zero. Second, the motivation in Carroll, Slacalek, and
Tokuoka (2012) for using this income process was its ability to better match the observed
wealth distribution of households, clearly a desirable goal for a model of consumer default.
At the same time, the focus here is more limited than in Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2004) as
they experiment with different types of aggregate shocks that make recessions particularly
bad, such as counter-cyclical earnings variance and asset destruction. They also allow for
shocks to the marginal utility of consumption, that could capture the effects of unexpected
medical expenses, lawsuits and divorce which are all important reasons for bankruptcy
filings (according to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) those were responsible for the
remaining third of all filings). My paper is interested in the properties of bankruptcy as
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an insurance against business cycle fluctuations, therefore these reasons are not considered
here.
The third related paper is MacGee, Livshits, and Fieldhouse (2011), who allow for changes
in the aggregate state of a life-cycle economy, but do so in a partial equilibrium setup,
thereby eliminating the feedback effects of savings on aggregate capital, wages and interest
rates. However, as mentioned above, these general equilibrium effects turn out to be quite
important for welfare calculations in my model. At the same time, the life-cycle component
of their model, as in Gordon (2013), introduces an additional incentive for borrowing, which
is missing from mine.
3.2 Literature review
The benefit of having a default option is most clearly demonstrated in Zame (1993): He
shows that in economies with incomplete asset markets, default can (Pareto-)improve allo-
cations in a way that simply extending the set of of available assets might not; by allowing
agents to enter into contracts that they may not be able honor in all future contingencies.3
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) shows that this benefit comes at a cost: In equilibrium the
default option raises the cost of borrowing for debtors in the economy, thereby making con-
sumption smoothing more expensive. Figuring out the net benefits is left to computable
general equilibrium models, a subset of which is reviewed here; Athreya (2005) provides an
3Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) extend the Arrow-Debreu model to allow agents to not always
deliver on their promises and prove the existence of a market equilibrium.
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extensive summary.
Athreya (2002) analyzed bankruptcy in an endowment economy and found that elimi-
nating bankruptcies altogether would be welfare improving. Li and Sarte (2006) extended
this work to include production and found that the stark result of Athreya (2002) goes
away: Once default is prohibited, borrowing becomes so cheap that precautionary savings
fall along with capital and wages, making the economy worse off.4 5 An interesting feature
of that paper is that it allows for two assets and thereby for a choice of the bankruptcy
chapter. Importantly, in both Athreya (2002) and Li and Sarte (2006) the interest paid by
all borrowers is the same regardless of the size of the debt (pooling loan contracts). From a
welfare point of view, this makes bankruptcy rather expensive: Even small loans, with zero
probability of default, carry a default premium. Moreover, it is questionable if that market
structure could be supported, since profitable deviations from the pooling equilibrium may
exist.
Chatterjee et al. (2007) analyzed the effects of the Bankruptcy Act Reform of 2005 in
what is essentially an extension of the Aiyagari (1994) model, highlighting an interesting
feature of models with separating loan contracts: Borrowing constraints emerge endoge-
nously. Lenders expect zero profit on each loan contract, so they have no incentive to shut
any (non-bankrupt) borrower out of the market. However, the default premium leads to
very high borrowing rates even for fairly small debt, meaning that consumers will not be
4In that model, agents always receive some income, which enables them to borrow up to a limit even if
they are not allowed to default.
5Recently, Da´vila et al. (2012) argued that in general laissez-faire allocations are constrained inefficient in
the Aiyagari (1994) model, as self-insurance leads to an increase in the aggregate wage, the very source
of the uncertainty.
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willing to borrow large amounts, even though they are allowed to. Therefore, if banks are
able to perfectly observe every payoff-relevant state variables, they will adjust borrowing
rates in the face of increased default probabilities, meaning that the cost of the insurance
provided by the default option is likely to rise steeply exactly when that insurance is needed
the most, a rather undesirable feature of an insurance contract that can become relevant in
the case of business cycles.
As for bankruptcy as an insurance against income shocks, Athreya and Simpson (2006)
argues that bankruptcy and unemployment insurance should be studied together: Since a
consequence of default is the exclusion from borrowing in the future, making self-insurance
harder, a generous unemployment insurance scheme (an alternative way to smooth con-
sumption) can decrease this cost and hence increase defaults. Their paper argues in favor
of a generous unemployment insurance and the abolition of bankruptcy.
In all of the above models, consumption smoothing in low-income states of nature was the
only reason for borrowing. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) use a life-cycle model (with
an exogenous risk-free rate) to contrast the benefits of smoothing consumption across time
versus states of nature: While bankruptcy facilitates consumption smoothing across states it
does so at the cost of increasing the price of intertemporal substitution. The welfare effects
of bankruptcy depend on the size of the shocks to income relative to consumers willingness
to shift consumption over the life-cycle, justifying the existence of different bankruptcy
laws between Europe and the U.S. by the more volatile income faced by U.S. households.
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2010) uses a similar model to explore the potential reasons
84
for the increase in unsecured consumer debt and finds that a drop in the cost of financial
intermediation is necessary to explain the trend exhibited in Figure 3.1.
The papers discussed so far all used models that were cast in a stationary macroeconomic
environment. To my knowledge, there are only three examples that allow for aggregate
fluctuations.6 The model in Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2004) uses the timing assumption
of the Krusell—Smith framework, but focuses on the effects of defaults and the related
endogenous credit constraints on business cycles and specifies a simpler individual income
process then this paper (though it features a richer set of shocks). Gordon (2013) analyzes
aggregate fluctuations in a life-cycle model, but does not explicitly account for the changing
probability of becoming and staying unemployed over the business cycle. MacGee, Livshits,
and Fieldhouse (2011) introduce aggregate shocks into a life-cycle model, which can affect
the probability distribution of permanent income shocks and the exogenous risk-free rate,
but do not allow for general equilibrium effects.
To summarize, the results cited above highlight that the evaluation of the benefits of
the default insurance scheme depends crucially on the shocks that the agents face and
the details of the model, including potential other ways to insure (such us unemployment
insurance and savings) and if general equilibrium effects are considered. The contribution
of this paper is to evaluate defaults in a general equilibrium setting where business cycle
fluctuations are taken into account and agents face realistic idiosyncratic income shocks as
6Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2005) also considers aggregate shocks, but allows agents to make savings decisions
after they know the aggregate state of the following period, hence default is driven entirely by the
realizations of idiosyncratic shocks. Put differently, loans are only held during times when agents face
no aggregate uncertainty.
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in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012).
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Consumer default
In the U.S. consumers can choose between two different forms of bankruptcy: If they file
under Chapter 7, they must give up all their existing assets in exchange for having most
of their debts discharged.7 If a debt was secured by some collateral, the debtor looses the
collateral. The other form of bankruptcy is Chapter 13, when the debts are restructured
and consumers follow the new payment plan for 3 to 5 years; if successfully completed, they
may see some of their debt discharged. The main difference between the two chapters is
that under Chapter 13 filers get to keep their assets. Practically, about three-quarters of
non-business filings are under Chapter 7 and only about a third of the Chapter 13 plans
are completed successfully (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000)).
Given these figures, the model is designed to resemble the features of Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
as are most of the papers cited in Section 3.2 (similar formulations of default appear in the
sovereign debt literature, see for example Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)).
A consumer may renege on debt obligations, in which case they will
(i) not be allowed to save or borrow in the period when they declare bankruptcy
(ii) face a flow cost of being bankrupt, which as Chatterjee et al. (2007) is interpreted as
7Student loans, taxes and alimony payments are non-defaultable even under Chapter 7.
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Figure 3.2: Non-business bankruptcy filings in the U.S. by Chapters
the increased cost of (mostly) services tied to a credit score (e.g. insurance policies,
cell phone contracts)
(iii) will be not allowed to borrow in future periods, unless a random shock wipes her credit
history clean.
3.3.2 The full model
The model is a variation of the original Krusell and Smith (1998) model due to Carroll,
Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012) with the option to default as in Chatterjee et al. (2007).
Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012) argue that the income process in the original Krusell
and Smith (1998) model is akin to consumers facing only temporary income shocks but no
permanent shocks. Adding a role for permanent income shocks is important here for two
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reasons:
(i) their presence makes households less likely to run up large debts (Athreya and Simpson
(2006)) and
(ii) help the model to match the wealth distribution observed in the data (the original
motivation in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012)).
Production
The production sector of the economy is the same as in Krusell and Smith (1998). The
aggregate production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form,
F (Kt, Lt;Zt) = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t ,
where Zt ∈ {1+∆, 1−∆} is a random aggregate productivity shock that follows a Markov-
process with transition matrix pi. Importantly, labor demand fluctuates exogenously with
the aggregate state of the economy and since labor supply is assumed to be inelastic,
employment will either be high or low depending on the aggregate state Lt ∈ {1 − ug, 1 −
ub}. While this is a very simplistic characterization of aggregate employment, it enables
a parsimonious formulation of the individual employment states, which will be described
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below in detail. Factor prices are set in competitive markets
rt = αZtK
α−1
t L
1−α
t − δ
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt L−αt ,
where rt is the interest earned on capital investments net of depreciation δ.
Consumers
The economy is populated by a unit mass of households. Fraction ω of them will be
patient while the remaining 1 − ω share will be impatient. The only difference between
the types of households is their subjective discount rate, β, otherwise their preferences and
endowments are similar. Types are perfectly observable by everybody, in particular, lenders
will immediately know the type of borrowers. Superscript i will denote type-specific objects
in the formulas below.
Consumers maximize lifetime utility, by allocating their uncertain flow of income to con-
sumption, Cit , and savings, taking into account that every period they face a constant
probability, D, of death as in Blanchard (1985). Their optimization problem is
max
{dit,Cit}∞t=1
∑
t
(βi(1−D))tu(Cit) = max{dit,Cit}∞t=1
∑
t
(βi(1−D))t (C
i
t)
1−ρ
1− ρ , (3.1)
subject to constraints that depend on credit history, hit, since access to credit markets in
period t will depend on past default decisions, {dis}t−1s=1, as described in Section 3.3.1.
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Income process Households inelastically supply one unit of labor in every period, which
may or may not meet with demand from producers. The probability of being employed
is governed by the same Markov-process as in Krusell and Smith (1998). This simple
description of employment is meant to capture the changing employment opportunities
of households across the business cycle. In general, employment probability is higher in
expansions than in recessions and it is more likely that an employed households remain
employed than an unemployed becoming employed. To give an example, the probability that
an employed household will keep its job in the next period (quarter) during an expansion
is 97.22 percent, while the probability of an unemployed finding a job in the next period
is only 66.67 percent even during an expansion. The same probabilities in a recession are
95.56 percent and 40 percent, respectively.
As in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012), households face two further shocks to their
labor income, Yt,
Yt =

(1− τt)ξtPtWt if employed (ιt = 1)
µPtWt if unemployed(ιt = 0)
Pt = Pt−1ψt.
ιt denotes the employment state (1 if employed), ξt is the realization of the temporary
income shock, Pt is the level of permanent income, ψt is the current realization of the
permanent income shock.
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Labor income is not the only uncertain part of household income. Interest incomes are
also stochastic as will be described in more detail below. While interest earned on savings
is unknown at time of the savings decision, the interest payable on loans is assumed to be
known upon signing the loan contract with the financial intermediary.
Credit market access Households with a clean credit history choosing not default in the
current (ht = 0, dt = 0) will also have a clean credit history in the next period (ht+1 = 0)
and face the budget constraint given by
qi(At, Pt, ιt;Kt, Zt)A
i
t + C
i
t = A
i
t−1 + Yt
0 > Ait ≥ Ai(Pt, ιt;Kt, Zt),
for borrowers and by
Ait + C
i
t =
1 + rt
1−DA
i
t−1 + Yt
Ait ≥ 0,
for savers. They have their current labor income Yt and their accumulated wealth to spend.
Interest receipts also include the redistributed wealth of households who died between pe-
riods t− 1 and t, hence the 1−D in the denominator. On the expenditure side, households
can spend their resources on consumption or invest them. If they wish to save, Ait ≥ 0,
they buy bonds at unit price that pay out the currently unknown amount of 1+rt+11−D to
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those alive in period t + 1. If they borrow, they issue bonds that financial intermediaries
purchase at a price of qi(At, Pt, ιt;Kt, Zt). Intermediaries will be entitled to the face value
of the bonds from households still alive in period t + 1. Note that the borrowing limit
Ai(Pt, ιt;Kt, Zt) depends on both aggregate and individual specific state variables and the
type of households.
Households with a clean credit history can choose to default (ht = 0, dt = 1), in which
case they have to consume their current labor income (minus bankruptcy costs), have their
debt wiped out and enter bankruptcy,
Ct = (1− γ)Yt
At = 0
ht+1 =

0 with probability λ
1 with probability 1− λ.
If they have a bad credit history (are bankrupt, ht = 1), they lose a faction γ of their
incomes and are only allowed to save but not to borrow,
At + Ct =
1 + rt
1−DAt−1 + (1− γ)Yt
At ≥ 0
ht+1 =

0 with probability λ
1 with probability 1− λ.
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Financial intermediaries
Intermediaries take deposits and invest it into capital or lend it to borrowers making zero
profits in the process. The return on the intermediary’s asset are stochastic: the marginal
product of capital will depend on the aggregate state of the next period, which is unknown
at the time investment decisions are made. Moreover, the return on loans is also uncertain:
the default decision on loans issued in period t, depends on the default decision of households
in period t+ 1, which are a function of the aggregate state in t+ 1. To ensure that the zero
profit condition holds in every period for every state of the world, I assume that, as in Krusell
and Smith (1998), the interest earnings are not known when deposits are made. Essentially
the savings vehicle in the model works like shares in a mutual fund. This structure ensures
that intermediaries do not accumulate wealth to buffer against states when their returns
turn out to be low.
When asset allocation is made, intermediaries know the expected return on capital,
Et(rt+1) = Pr(Zt+1 = Z
g|Zt)(αZgKα−1t+1 (1− ug)1−α − δ)
+ Pr(Zt+1 = Z
b|Zt)(αZbKα−1t+1 (1− ub)1−α − δ).
The expected income in the next period from each bond of a loan of size At after ac-
counting for defaults and death is,
(1−D) [Pr(Zt+1 = Zg|Zt)(1− Pr(dit+1 = 1|At, Pt+1, ιt+1, ψt+1, ξt+1;Kt+1, Zg))
+ Pr(Zt+1 = Z
b|Zt)(1− Pr(dit+1 = 1|At, Pt+1, ιt+1, ψt+1, ξt+1;Kt+1, Zb))
]
,
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where the Pr(dit+1 = 1|.) operator integrates out the default decision across individual
employment states ιt+1 and incomes shocks ψt+1, ξt+1 given aggregate state (Kt+1, Zt+1).
The return on loans has to match Et(rt+1) in expectation, so the price of these loans is
qi(At,Pt+1, ιt;Kt, Zt) =
1−D
Et(rt+1)
·
∑
j∈{g,b}
Pr(Zj |Zt)(1− Pr(dit+1 = 1|At, Pt+1, ιt+1, ψt+1, ξt+1;Kt+1, Zj)).
(3.2)
As in Chatterjee et al. (2007), intermediaries will post bond prices for any loan size Ait < 0,
but at some point these prices will become so low that households will be unwilling to take
them.
Government
The government collects taxes to pay for the unemployment insurance and keeps a balanced
budget in each period,
τt =
µWtut
Wt(1− ut) ,
hence income taxes are counter-cyclical in the model.
Market clearing
Finally, in equilibrium goods and asset markets must clear. In the asset markets, this
requires that net asset holdings of consumers at the end of period t should equal the amount
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of capital in period t+ 1,
Kt+1 = ω
[
(1− ut)
∫ ∞
0
A dFH(At, Pt, ιt = 1;Kt, Zt)
+ ut
∫ ∞
0
A dFH(At, Pt, ιt = 0;Kt, Zt)
]
+ (1− ω)
[
(1− ut)
∫ ∞
0
A dFL(At, Pt, ιt = 1;Kt, Zt)
+ ut
∫ ∞
0
A dFL(At, Pt, ιt = 0;Kt, Zt)
]
+ ω
[
(1− ut)
∫ 0
−∞
qH(A,Pt, ιt = 1;Kt, Zt) ·A dFH(At, Pt, ιt = 1;Kt, Zt)
+ ut
∫ 0
−∞
qH(A,Pt, ιt = 0;Kt, Zt) ·A dFH(At, Pt, ιt = 0;Kt, Zt)
]
+ (1− ω)
[
(1− ut)
∫ 0
−∞
qL(A,Pt, ιt = 1;Kt, Zt) ·A dFL(At, Pt, ιt = 1;Kt, Zt)
+ ut
∫ 0
−∞
qL(A,Pt, ιt = 0;Kt, Zt) ·A dFL(At, Pt, ιt = 0;Kt, Zt)
]
.
In the above equation, the first four terms sum up the savings of patient (first two terms)
and impatient (next two terms) households, taking into account that the distribution of
asset holdings, F i(.), will be different not only across types but also across employment
states within types. This also applies for borrowing (last four terms in the summation),
where one should keep in mind that the amount loaned by lenders is q(A, .)A, At denotes
the face value of the bonds.
Walras’ law ensures that the goods market is also in equilibrium.
95
3.3.3 Recursive formulation
Using the ideas in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
the problem can be re-scaled by ZtPt (i.e. at =
At
ZtPt
,ct =
Ct
ZtPt
,yt =
Yt
ZtPt
) and rewritten in
terms of a single state variable, “disposable resources” (m), instead of keeping track of both
A and P (see also p. 578 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)). “Disposable resources” can be
thought of as the largest amount of consumption that can be financed in the current period
if the household exhausts its borrowing capacity. If this turns non-positive the household
will have to default, a situation which, following Chatterjee et al. (2007), will be referred
to as involuntary default. To economize on notation, let variables with a prime (′) denote
the value of a variable in the next period, those without the prime refer to current values.
The income process with the new notation becomes
y′ =

(1− τ ′)ξ′W ′Z′ ι′ = 1
µW
′
Z′ ι
′ = 0
.
The households’ problem can be rewritten as follows. Starting with the simplest case,
defaulting households are freed of all pre-existing debt at the expense of being shut out of
saving and borrowing for one period and becoming bankrupt: which entails paying a flow
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cost (γy) each period.
ViD(y, ι;K,Z) = u((1− γ)y) + βi(1−D){λE [(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV iB(m′, ι′;K ′, Z ′)]
+ (1− λ)E [(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV i(0, ι′;K ′, Z ′)]}
m′ = y′.
Note, that beyond the default decision, there is no optimization here, default is entirely
governed by regulations.
Bankrupt households (those with h = 1), also pay the flow cost of bankruptcy (γy), but
solve a consumption-saving problem where borrowing is not allowed,
V B(m, ι;K,Z) = max
a
u(c) + βi(1−D){λE [(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV iB(m′, ι′;K ′, Z ′)]
+ (1− λ)E [(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV i(m′, ι′;K ′, Z ′)]}
s.t. c = m− a,
m′ =
1 + r′
1−D
a
ψ′Γ′
+ (1− γ)y′
a ≥ 0.
Therefore, their end of period assets will equal “disposable resources” minus current con-
sumption and next periods “disposable resources” will equal to current savings plus interest
and next period’s labor income y′ minus the bankruptcy cost. If they are allowed to re-
turn to the credit markets, they will not have to pay the bankruptcy cost γy′ and their
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“disposable resources” will increase by their borrowing limit.
If the consumer has a good credit history (h = 0) entering into the period, she has the
option to default on her loans after the realization of the income shocks
V i(m, ι;K,Z) = max
d∈{0,1}
[
ViN(m, ι;K,Z),ViD(m, ι;K,Z)
]
.
Not defaulting in the current period leads to,
ViN(m, ι;K,Z) = max
a
u(c) + βi(1−D)E [(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV i(m′, ι′;K ′, Z ′)]
s.t. c =

m− a+ mina q(a, ι;K,Z)a if a ≥ 0
m− q(a, ι;K,Z)a+ mina q(a, ι;K,Z)a if a < 0
m′ =

1+r′
1−D
a
ψ′Γ′ + y
′ −mina q(a, ι′;K ′, Z ′)a if a ≥ 0
a
ψ′Γ′ + y
′ −mina q(a, ι′;K ′, Z ′)a if a < 0
a ≥ argminaq(a, ι;K,Z)a.
First, note that, as in Chatterjee et al. (2007) the borrowing limit is not set exogenously,
it depends on the loan price schedule, which in turn is a function of the default decision of
consumers. This leads to variations in the borrowing limit across states: an unemployed
in a recession will face stricter borrowing limits than an employed person in a boom. This
is reflected in the right-hand side of the last constraint, mina q(a, ι;K,Z)a < 0 denotes
the maximum level of funds that a household is able to borrow in the current period, by
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promising to repay a in the following one.
The other two equations are just the two sides of the flow budget constraints, with the
borrowing limit added to “disposable resources”. The first equation details the potential
uses of these funds: consumption and purchase or sale of bonds. If a household chooses
to save a ≥ 0, then by definition no borrowing will be used to finance consumption, there-
fore the borrowing limit has to be subtracted from m, essentially the household “saves”
(a−mina q(a, ι;K,Z)a).
If the household decides to borrow, a < 0, it does so by promising to pay a to the
lender in the following period. The lender purchases this promise for −q(a, ι;K,Z)a. Con-
sumption, in this case, will equal “disposable resources”, m, minus unused credit lines
− (mina q(a, ι;K,Z)− q(a, ι;K,Z)a).
The second constraint defines the amount of “disposable resources” just before the con-
sumption decision in the next period. The potential sources are savings carried over from
the current period, if a ≥ 0, with interest earnings; next period’s labor income and unused
lines of credit. If a household borrows in the current period, a < 0, then it promises to pay
a to the lender in the following period. Other than that, it will still earn labor income and
have access to unused credit lines.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined as a set of
(i) factor prices W (K,Z), r(K,Z) given by the respective marginal products
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(ii) loan price schedules qi(a, ι;K,Z) that satisfies the zero-profit condition given the op-
timal default decisions of consumers
(iii) default decisions and asset choices a(m, ι;K,Z) that solve the consumer optimization
problem and respect the market clearing condition for assets
(iv) a law of motion for the distribution of agents across asset and employment states, that
is consistent with a′(m, ι;K,Z)
(v) tax rates, τ(Z), that ensure that the government runs a balanced budget in every
period.
3.4 Calibration and solution method
Most of the parameters are taken directly from Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012),
Krusell and Smith (1998), Den Haan, Judd, and Juillard (2010) or Chatterjee et al. (2007).
For the parameters that do not come from these studies, the main goal of the calibration is
to match the share of agents with negative net worth and the default frequencies observed in
the data. To match the moments of the wealth distribution the version of the model without
aggregate shocks was used, that is, there are no technology shocks and unemployment is
set to 7 percent in every period.
As is common in the Krusell-Smith framework, a model where all agents have the same
life-time utility function is not able to generate a sufficiently spread-out wealth distribution:
Most of the households will be concentrated around the mean net worth in the economy.
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For the purposes of this paper, this is problematic, because defaults happen at the left
tail of the wealth distribution. To generate enough borrowing, and hence default, share ω
of the households will have a discount factor of βH , while the remaining 1 − ω share will
discount future utilities with βL < βH . The interpretation of the different time preference
rates is the same as in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012): While the Blanchardian
overlapping generations structure does allow for a finite life expectancy, and thereby an
ergodic distribution of permanent income, it does not capture life-cycle changes in the
income profile of households. Agents with a lower β can be thought of as young people who
expect a steeper income profile than their older counterparts.
Apart from the βs the other parameters influencing the wealth distribution in the steady-
state model are the level of capital and risk aversion of households. Risk aversion is set to 1
(log utility) as in Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012) and Den Haan, Judd, and Juillard
(2010). Capital is set so that the interest rate on deposits in the model without aggregate
shocks is 1 percent. With these parameters, the steady-state model is able to replicate the
6.7 percent of agents with negative net worth reported in Table 2 of Chatterjee et al. (2007)
in the steady-state model.
The default rate is under predicted by the model with aggregate shocks: Only an average
of 0.17 of households default in a quarter, while the default rate in the data fluctuated
around 0.3 percent before the 2005 Bankruptcy reform. Even if job-related reasons make
up only about two-thirds of defaults (see Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000)), this is
low. On the other hand, the model over predicts the cyclical correlation of defaults with
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Description Parameter Value Target/Source
Production
Capital share α 0.36 BSKS
Depreciation δ 0.025 BSKS
Interest on savings (steady-state) rss 0.01 BSKS
Utility function
Time preference (patient) βH 0.9910 BSKS
Time preference (impatient) βL 0.9723 % of hh. with debt = 6.7
Share of patient households ω 0.6188 rss = 0.01
Inverse of life expectancy (in quarters) D 1/160 BSKS
Risk-aversion ρ 1 BSKS
Income process
Transitory income shock σ2θ 0.010 · 4 BSKS
Permanent income shock σ2ψ 0.016/4 BSKS
Unemployment benefit µ 0.15 BSKS
Default
Probability of staying bankrupt λ 1− 1/40 Chatterjee et al. (2007)
Flow cost of bankruptcy γ 0.04 Pr(Default)
Aggregate shocks
Aggregate state transition probability 0.125 KS Orig.
Productivity shock ∆Z 0.01 KS Orig.
Unemployment (expansion) ug 0.04 KS Orig.
Unemployment (recession) ub 0.10 KS Orig.
Unemployment (steady-state) uss 0.07 KS JEDC
Sources: BSKS—Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka (2012); KS Orig.—Krusell and Smith (1998);
KS JEDC—Den Haan, Judd, and Juillard (2010).
Table 3.2: Calibrated parameter values
unemployment. In the model, we get a strong positive correlation of 0.82, which is about
twice as high as in the data.
3.4.1 Computational considerations
Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2010) argue that the choice of the numerical solution
method is not innocuous in the Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) type sovereign default models,
which has a very similar setup to the model presented above. In particular, methods based
on a coarsely discretized state-space lead to an interest rate schedule that is a step function.
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Getting the interest rate schedule right in this model is key: Impatient consumers are looking
to borrow at low interest rates. In equilibrium, however, defaults on large amounts of debt
push interest rates up quite steeply, discouraging borrowing. Flat sections of the interest
rate schedule would encourage consumers to borrow up to the “edge” of the step functions,
thereby potentially overestimating borrowing in the economy. Their suggested solution,
which is adopted here, is to use a continuous approximation to the value functions: Value
functions were approximated by cubic spline interpolation.8
Solving models with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate fluctuations also
involves a choice of how to model agents’ expectation of future prices. Den Haan (2010)
recently compared a number of available techniques to do this and found that the method
of Reiter (2010) did well both in terms of the accuracy of the solution and the speed of
computation. This method relies on the ergodic distribution of the steady-state version
of the underlying model to predict future changes in the (endogenous) aggregate state
variables. See the Appendix for more details on how the algorithm was implemented.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Borrowing and default
Before turning to the welfare comparisons it is instructive to look at how defaults happen
in the model.
8Increasing the number of discrete points to a level where the approximation becomes reasonable is not
computationally feasible.
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Figure 3.3: Price schedules for defaultable bonds
Borrowing Figure 3.3 depicts an example of the bond price schedule posted by lenders.
In line with Theorem 6 in Chatterjee et al. (2007), at low levels of debt no consumer is
expected to default, therefore the borrowing rate is constant in this region. This is actually
the case for a fairly large interval of debts, but once the default probability becomes positive
it decreases bond prices rather steeply in every possible state (a, ι, β;K,Z).
Figure 3.4 depicts the same information, but instead of focusing on the price of each bond,
it shows the (negative of the) total amount that borrowers receive upon entering the loan
contracts. It is interesting to note that the maximum of the borrowing amount schedule
is reached shortly after bond prices start to decrease. It will never be optimal to pick a
contract that is to the left of the minimum of the q(a)a schedule depicted on Figure 3.4,
since that would mean that the borrower could obtain the same amount of funds now by
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Figure 3.4: Amount received (q(a)a), when issuing a defaultable bonds
promising a small repayment. In general the limit depends on both the aggregate and
individual state variables (including the borrower’s type), but the fluctuations in the credit
limit due to aggregate shocks are practically small, less than 5 percent of quarterly wages.
Defaults While the model features a number of shocks to households’ income, Table 3.3
shows that in the simulations, the main reason for defaulting is unemployment: 97 percent
of the bankruptcy filings are made by unemployed. Consequently, most of the defaults
happen in recessions, when the probability of not finding work increases from 33.3 percent
to 60. The mean of the transitory income shock conditional on defaulting coincides almost
perfectly with the unconditional mean of the distribution it was drawn from indicating that
temporary shocks to income do not push households into default. Permanent income shocks
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Mean
Assets before default (normalized) -1.64
Permanent income shock before default 0.96
Transitory income shock before default 0.99
Share of defaulters unemployed 0.97
Share of defaults in recession 0.77
Average unemployment duration before default (quarters) 5.1
Table 3.3: Defaults in the simulations
are only slightly more correlated with defaults, on average defaulters suffer a 4 percent
decrease in their permanent incomes in the period when they default. Assets relative to
permanent income average -1.64, very close to the borrowing limit of impatient households
in most aggregate states.
Based on these observations it is instructive to look at how households cope with long
unemployment spells in the model with and without default. Figure 3.5 displays the time
series of an impatient household that starts period 1 with zero assets and is employed. The
household is assumed to become unemployed in the next period and remain unemployed
for the following 5 periods. The income shocks are set to their mean values of 1. The
solid (blue) line shows the evolution of the consumption and end-of-period asset series in
the model with default and borrowing while the dashed (red) line shows the same series
in the model without default and hence no borrowing. While employed in the first period,
the household increases its asset holdings, though the increase is much bigger in the model
without borrowing. Correspondingly, consumption is higher in the model with default.
As the unemployment spell begins, both households decrease their consumption by similar
amounts, with the household in the default model accumulating debt. At the beginning
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of period 4 the household in the model without default runs out of savings and is down
to consuming her income (unemployment benefit). While nearing its borrowing limit, the
household in the default model is still able to supplement the unemployment benefit with
additional funds through going further into debt. By period 5, the fourth period in unem-
ployment, both households behave as essentially hand-to-mouth consumers consuming their
current income (unemployment benefit), with the notable difference that for the household
with outstanding debt, this still means incurring further debt just to pay the interest due
on the accumulated credit. In period 6 the indebted household defaults and sees its asset
position return to 0, while incurring the pecuniary cost (γY ) of bankruptcy.
All in all, the household with access to credit was able to enjoy significantly higher
consumption for 4 out of the six periods in the simulation. Given that a 5 period long
unemployment spell is rather rare, even in a recession its probability is just under 8 per-
cent (∼ 0.65), most households who start to go down this same route are likely to escape
somewhere along the way, without resorting to bankruptcy protection.
3.5.2 Welfare implications of bankruptcy
To evaluate the usefulness of the default option, simulations from two models are compared.
The first is a model where defaults are not possible, which, following the logic of Zame (1993)
also means that there will be no borrowing in the economy. Since there are future states
of nature where consumers’ income is zero (the support of both the permanent income
and the transitory income shock approaches zero), they would not be able to commit to
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Figure 3.5: Simulated consumption and asset position of unemployed.
repaying loans in all possible future contingencies. The second model is the one that allows
for defaults and hence for unsecured credit.
The two economies do indeed behave differently: The economy with default has a lower
capital stock by about 5 percent, as agents build up smaller precautionary balances against
idiosyncratic shocks since borrowing can help them smooth consumption in unfavorable
states of nature. This difference translates into a meaningful difference in welfare, with
the economy with default faring worse. As in Krusell and Smith (1999), the welfare is
computed as the average lifetime utility of agents in the simulations, where averaging is
over both agents and time, to account for the effects of aggregate fluctuations. Formally,
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define lifetime utility from period t onward as
U i(mt) =
T∑
s=t
((1−D)βi)s−tu(Ci(ms)) + ((1−D)βi)T−tE[V i(mT )], (3.3)
where ms denotes “disposable resources” after the realization of the income shocks in period
s, Ci(m) is the optimal consumption policy of a type i household and V i(m) is the value
function of a type i household. (For simplify, the dependence of these functions on other
state variables has been suppressed.) Then average welfare is computed as
W =
∑T
t=1
(∑
nH U
H
n (mt) +
∑
nL U
L
n (mt)
)
N · T ,
where ni is the number of type i households in the simulation, N = nH + nL, and T is the
number of time periods used in the simulation.
Using Lucas (1987)’s metric of a compensating exogenous change in consumption9 that
would leave agents indifferent between the two economies shows that consumption in the
model without default could decrease by 7.7 percent and households would still be as well
off as they are in the model with default.
It should be noted that the odds in this comparison are stacked against the default
economy, as the flow-cost of bankruptcy is treated as pure deadweight loss. It is not probably
an overstatement that all of these costs are pure deadweight, some of it might just be
redistribution across agents. For example, higher insurance rates, due to a bad credit
9Replace u(Ci(ms)) with u((1− χ)Ci(ms)) and find the value of χ that makes the Ws in the two models
equal.
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No default Default
Aggregate capital 33.06 31.37
Average wage 2.31 2.27
Average interest rate (quarterly %) 1.19 1.24
Percent with negative net worth
High β N/A 5.42
Low β N/A 25.07
Percent defaulting
High β N/A 0.08
Low β N/A 0.32
Percent in bankruptcy
High β N/A 2.44
Low β N/A 9.95
Note: Average factor prices computed at the average capital level and
averaged over aggregate states.
Table 3.4: Aggregate statistics in the economy with and without default
history, do not represent a loss to society. With around 5.3 percent of the population is in
bankruptcy losing 4 percent of their income this is not a trivial amount, but still an order
of magnitude below the estimated welfare loss.
Table 3.5 shows that the overall change in welfare masks a great deal of heterogeneity
among different groups. First, the emergence of borrowing increases the budget set of all
non-bankrupt agents and for the poor, impatient households this is of great use: They are
able to more than double their consumption, from 0.76 to 2.08. The general equilibrium
effects, however, leave the rest of the impatient households significantly worse-off. As the
capital stock decreases, wages fall while interest rates increase. Since impatient households
are asset-poor (note that asset holdings equal to the average wage would already put an
impatient household into the top quintile of the wealth distribution of her type), the net
effect of falling wages and rising interest rates is a significant drop in incomes. Patient,
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No default Default
High β Low β High β Low β
Percentiles of the wealth distribution
Bottom 20% 10.45 0.73 1.81 −0.11
Bottom 40% 21.37 1.42 12.90 0.22
Bottom 60% 36.92 2.21 28.93 0.69
Bottom 80% 68.35 3.42 57.94 1.45
Average consumption by quintiles
1st quintile 1.77 0.76 1.74 2.08
2nd quintile 1.85 1.31 2.03 1.14
3rd quintile 2.04 1.80 1.83 1.53
4th quintile 2.55 2.35 2.24 2.05
5th quintile 5.55 4.79 5.32 3.90
Table 3.5: Heterogeneous effects in the economy with and without default
and therefore asset-rich, households are affected to a lesser extent by the introduction of
defaults: higher interest rates offset the decline in their wage.
The U-shaped welfare effects found here are similar to the one described in Krusell et al.
(2009), where the authors analyzed the effects of eliminating business cycles. In their
experiment, households face reduced income risk which makes the poorest of them only
slightly better-off. In the case of default, however, households’ willingness of taking out
loans leaves the poorest much better-off.
3.6 Concluding remarks
The paper set out to investigate the costs and benefits of bankruptcy protection in a model
with incomplete asset markets and both aggregate fluctuations in employment and idiosyn-
cratic shocks to household income. Without the option to renege on prior commitments,
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households are unwilling to borrow, since a bad realization of the income shock could leave
them with very little (if any) resources to spend on consumption. As shown by Zame (1993),
allowing for default shelters them from the worst of these outcomes and opens up the un-
secured credit market, which enables the poorest households to increase their consumption
substantially, greatly increasing their welfare.
For the majority of the households in the economy, however, the welfare effects are neg-
ative. The middle of the wealth distribution is left worse off, since the general equilibrium
effect of the emergence of the credit market is a drop in net savings, which feeds through
into a decline in average wages. At the very top of the income distribution, the drop in
average wages is more than offset by increasing interest incomes leaving this group better
off.
The importance of the general equilibrium effects hinges crucially on the plausibility
of precautionary motives driving savings. By themselves they are unable to account for
all savings in the economy (see Jappelli, Padula, and Pistaferri (2008), Fulford (2012)),
especially for those at the top of the wealth distribution it is unlikely that precaution
is a major factor. On the other hand, Fulford (2010) argues that even changes in the
uncertainty about the availability of unsecured credit led U.S. consumers to increase their
savings during the latest financial crisis. Others suggested that precautionary behavior can
explain the movements of the U.S. savings rate.: Since the 1980s increasing household wealth
and borrowing opportunities lead to a drop in the savings rate, which quickly reversed as
the Great Recession and the accompanying financial crisis wiped out some of the earlier
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increases in wealth and led to tighter borrowing constraints (see, for example, Hall (2011),
Carroll, Sommer, and Slacalek (2012), Lorenzoni and Guerrieri (2011)). While these findings
lend some credibility to the general equilibrium effects emphasized in this paper, there is
clearly much to be learned about the motivations for saving.
113
Appendix A
U.S. Consumer Demand for Cash in the
Era of Low Interest Rates and Electronic
Payments
A.1 Regression tables
A.2 Data
The 2008 SCPC had 1,010 respondents, while from 2009 onwards the sample size roughly
doubled. Importantly, past respondents are recruited into later waves of the survey, so
pooling the three waves of the survey produces a(n unbalanced) panel. Table A.3 reports
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(1) (2) (3)
Withdrawal amnt. Avg. cash in wallet Num. of withdrawals
log(Interest rate) −.047 (.029) −.082∗∗ (.040) .061∗∗ (.030)
log(Interest rate) × Revolver .111∗∗∗ (.039) .100∗ (.054) −.037 (.039)
log(Cash share) .140∗∗∗ (.019) .190∗∗∗ (.025) .194∗∗∗ (.018)
log(Income) .264∗∗∗ (.053) .333∗∗∗ (.070) .210∗∗∗ (.050)
log(Wealth) .072∗∗∗ (.015) .075∗∗∗ (.017) −.011 (.011)
Revolver .035 (.089) −.014 (.123) .197∗∗ (.086)
Rewards credit card .173∗∗∗ (.048) .028 (.065) −.155∗∗∗ (.049)
Age .005∗∗ (.003) .014∗∗∗ (.003) .010∗∗∗ (.002)
Male .107∗∗ (.047) .306∗∗∗ (.057) −.009 (.043)
Single .043 (.086) −.027 (.113) −.020 (.082)
Married −.059 (.057) −.189∗∗ (.075) −.084 (.053)
Employed −.189∗∗∗ (.058) −.127∗ (.073) .146∗∗∗ (.053)
Self-employed .150∗∗ (.074) .286∗∗∗ (.097) −.041 (.068)
Num. of household members −.071∗∗∗ (.022) −.108∗∗∗ (.029) .043∗∗ (.020)
Withdrawal method:
Bank teller .364∗∗∗ (.050) .272∗∗∗ (.061) −.308∗∗∗ (.044)
Check casher .370 (.365) .510 (.371) −.376 (.311)
Cashback −.762∗∗∗ (.050) −.294∗∗∗ (.075) .206∗∗∗ (.052)
Employer .508∗∗∗ (.179) .263 (.172) .490∗∗∗ (.135)
Family −.607∗∗∗ (.116) .062 (.145) −.248∗∗ (.117)
Other .371 (.263) .588∗∗∗ (.189) −.154 (.164)
Mills ratios:
Interest–bearing account 1.105∗∗ (.539) .270 (.689) −.220 (.495)
Credit card −.090 (.248) .046 (.332) .818∗∗∗ (.219)
Constant .857 (.698) −.800 (.921) −1.432∗∗ (.668)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Sample effects Yes Yes Yes
Month effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .284 .206 .171
Observations 2,440 2,363 2,435
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (1,000 replications). ∗ p < 0.10 ∗∗ p < 0.05 ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.1: Cash demand specifications using OLS
the exact details of the composition of our estimation sample,1 which is only a subset of
the full SCPC sample, since we estimated cash demand only for a subsample who have an
interest–bearing account and at least one credit card (see Table 1.2 for adoption rates).
1The number of observations included in the second-stage regression differs somewhat across the left-
hand-side variables, due to zero or missing responses. Table A.3 shows the sample composition for the
specification when the dependent variable is the withdrawal amount.
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(1) (2) (3)
Withdrawal amnt. Avg. cash in wallet Num. of withdrawals
log(Interest rate) −.056 (.037) −.059 (.048) .032 (.041)
log(Interest rate) × Revolver .116∗∗∗ (.042) .084 (.058) −.016 (.046)
log(Cash share) .293 (.319) −.149 (.487) .671∗∗ (.336)
log(Income) .250∗∗∗ (.052) .351∗∗∗ (.079) .200∗∗∗ (.054)
log(Wealth) .062∗∗∗ (.024) .092∗∗∗ (.030) −.042∗ (.022)
Revolver .064 (.111) −.082 (.154) .289∗∗ (.119)
Rewards credit card .174∗∗∗ (.052) .019 (.074) −.127∗∗ (.056)
Age .004 (.003) .016∗∗∗ (.004) .007∗ (.003)
Male .061 (.106) .419∗∗ (.167) −.160 (.111)
Single .031 (.080) −.009 (.120) −.033 (.087)
Married −.053 (.056) −.204∗∗∗ (.078) −.072 (.058)
Employed −.201∗∗∗ (.065) −.087 (.092) .082 (.070)
Self-employed .151∗∗ (.076) .294∗∗∗ (.098) −.055 (.063)
Num. of household members −.069∗∗∗ (.022) −.112∗∗∗ (.031) .056∗∗∗ (.021)
Withdrawal method:
Bank teller .349∗∗∗ (.059) .300∗∗∗ (.076) −.359∗∗∗ (.056)
Check casher .283 (.375) .667 (.441) −.597∗ (.343)
Cashback −.719∗∗∗ (.107) −.381∗∗∗ (.147) .335∗∗∗ (.116)
Employer .478∗∗∗ (.173) .338∗ (.204) .405∗∗ (.172)
Family −.606∗∗∗ (.113) .031 (.158) −.236∗∗ (.115)
Other .379 (.260) .593∗∗∗ (.193) −.148 (.160)
Mills ratios:
Interest–bearing account 1.022∗ (.580) .542 (.833) −.541 (.564)
Credit card −.253 (.408) .349 (.589) .459 (.368)
Constant 1.493 (1.322) −2.019 (1.965) .103 (1.393)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Sample effects Yes Yes Yes
Month effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .259 .133 −.139
Hansen J-test 1.264 2.088 11.241
p-value 0.2609 0.1484 0.0008
Observations 2,440 2,363 2,435
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.2: Instrumental variable estimation
Nonresponse and zero response for variables that enter the estimation in logarithms further
decrease the sample size.
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Number of observations by year
2008 2009 2010 Total
Full SCPC sample 1,010 2,173 2,102 5,285
Estimation sample 558 763 1,028 2,349
# of respondents in 2008 only 166
# of respondents in 2009 only 190
# of respondents in 2010 only 421
# of panel respondents 2008 and 2009 77 77
# of panel respondents 2008 and 2010 144 144
# of panel respondents 2009 and 2010 347 347
# of panel respondents 2008-10 179 179 179
Table A.3: Overview of the SCPC sample composition
A.2.1 Variable definitions
Unless otherwise noted, the variables come from the SCPC.
Withdrawal amount. The amount of cash usually withdrawn at the primary location.
These questions changed over time. In 2008, the SCPC asked for the amount of cash most
often withdrawn, while in 2009 and 2010 it asked for the amount most often withdrawn from
the primary withdrawal location. According to the 2009 and 2010 data, withdrawals from
the primary location dominate secondary sources by a ratio of 2:1; hence, the amount of
cash most often withdrawn and the amount of cash most often withdrawn from the primary
location are likely to be the same in practice. The systematic effects of asking the questions
in a slightly different way should be absorbed by the time dummy in the regressions.
Number of withdrawals. The number of withdrawals at the primary location. The survey
instrument changed in 2009; in 2008 it asked for the number of withdrawals in a typical
period, while from 2009 onwards it asked for the number of withdrawals from the primary
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location in a typical period.
Cash in wallet. In all three surveys respondents were asked to report the cash in their
wallet, purse, and/or pocket.
Interest rates. See Section 1.3.3 for details. Figure A.1 shows that even within states there
is considerable variation in 2010. The other two years yield qualitatively similar graphs.
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®Figure A.1: Alternative cost of cash by respondents across states and time
Family income. The SCPC has data on (annual) household income, which will proxy
for cash spending. Household income in the survey, however, is recorded as a categorical
variable (with 17 categories). In the estimation below, we assigned to each household the
average of its category’s bounds as household income in order to convert the variable into
a continuous regressor. For the top income category we assigned the median income of
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households with over $200, 000 in annual income from the 2007 wave of the SCF. While
this data transformation introduces a measurement error on an explanatory variable that
is clearly correlated with the error term in the regression, it makes the interpretation of
the estimated coefficient on income straightforward. As a robustness check, we re-ran all
the estimations using dummy variables for the income categories, and the results remained
unchanged.
Income rank. Binary variables indicating whether respondents’ income ranks first, second,
or third in their household.
Branches. Another variable added to the SCPC from a different data source is the number
of bank branches (per 1,000 residents) by states. The Summary of Deposits has data on
the number of bank branches by states (as of June 30 of a given year), while the population
estimates (by states) come from the Census Bureau. This variable is analogous to the
one used by Lippi and Secchi (2009) and is used to control for the availability of modern
payment technologies: a higher number corresponds to superior account access technology.
Assessment of payment instrument characteristics. The SCPC asks respondents to rate
the payment instruments on a scale of 1 to 5, based on cost, acceptance, and security
(5 corresponds to the best outcome, which is very low cost, very secure, and very widely
accepted). Following Schuh and Stavins (2010), we transformed the absolute ratings of
payment instrument i ∈ {cash, debit card, credit card} into relative ones by using the
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following transformation (for example, for the rating of the cost of payment instrument i),
Cost of i =
∑
j 6=i
[log(Cost rating of i)− log(Cost rating of j)] .
Hence, for this set of variables a higher value means that i is more favorable than the other
payment instruments, based on a particular characteristic.
Month indicators. The 2008 survey was conducted in September and October, while the
2009 wave was administered between November 2009 and January 2010; in the 2010 survey
most of the responses again came in September and October. Since household spending is
seasonal, the benchmark regressions include monthly dummies to account for this source of
the variation in the data. Note, however, that two of our cash variables (amount withdrawn
and number of withdrawals) refer to the typical period and should not be influenced by
short-term, seasonal fluctuations.
Sample indicators. The American Life Panel (ALP), from which the SCPC sample is
drawn, expanded considerably over the 2008–2010 period. The ALP sample is derived
(mostly) from the Michigan Survey of Consumers and the Stanford Face-to-Face Recruited
Internet Survey Platform. To make sure that the “origin” of respondents does not affect
the results, dummy variables control for this sampling effect in the regressions. For more
details on the SCPC see Foster et al. (2009) and Foster et al. (2011).
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Appendix B
Consumer Bankruptcy Protection as
Insurance against Business Cycles
B.1 Details of the solution algorithm
B.1.1 Solving the model with aggregate shocks
The solution method in Reiter (2010) was adapted, since solving the model with the en-
dogenous grid points method did not work out. Here simple value function iteration is
used insetad. I follow his steps up to deriving the proxy distributions, but then have to
do things a little differently. The goal is to find the value functions V (m, ι;K,Z) and the
corresponding policy functions and factor/asset prices.
As in the basic Krusell–Smith (KS) model, since decision makers are forward-looking, all
of these objects depend on their expectation of future prices, which in turn depend on the
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evolution of
(i) the exogenously changing aggregate productivity shock Z, and
(ii) the evolution of the aggregate capital stock K.
K, however, is determined by the decisions (savings and default) that agents make, hence
this is a (nested) fixed point problem. As usual in the KS solution algorithms, I will
first take as given a V (•) and compute the implied evolution of K ′(K,Z,Z ′), then update
V (•) according to K’(K,Z,Z’) and repeat this until convergence is achieved. The difference
between the original KS algorithm and Reiter (2010) is howK ′(K,Z,Z ′) is found. In KS this
is a linear regression of K ′ on K,Z and Z ′ in the data simulated using the current iteration
of V (•) (and the resulting policy functions). In Reiter (2010), the steady-state distribution
of capital is used to construct proxy distributions, D(K,Z), which then together with the
current iteration of V (•) (and the resulting policy functions) is used to find K ′(K,Z,Z ′).
The goal is to find the value functions defined at the end of Section 3.3.3. This is done
in two steps: (i) a guess for K ′(K,Z,Z ′) is constructed and using this guess (ii) the value
function is updated.
Let’s start with a guess for V (m, ι;K,Z). The goal is to find a guess for K ′(K,Z,Z ′)
that is consistent with this value function.
1. Guess K ′(K,Z,Z ′).
2. Find V (m, ι;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′) through interpolation of V (m, ι;K,Z).
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3. Integrate out idiosyncratic shocks
Eι′,θ′,ψ′(Γ
′ψ′)1−ρV (m′, ι′;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′) =
Pr(ι′ = e|Z ′)
Pr(ι′ = e|Z ′) + Pr(ι′ = u|Z ′)
∫
θ′
∫
ψ′
(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV (m′, ι′ = e;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′)+
Pr(ι′ = u|Z ′)
Pr(ι′ = e|Z ′) + Pr(ι′ = u|Z ′)
∫
ψ′
(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV (m′, ι′ = u;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′).
4. Using this expected value function, solve the consumer’s optimization problem assum-
ing that agents know with certainty that next periods aggregate state is Z ′. For
example,
V˜N(m, ι;K,Z,Z ′) = max
a˜
u(c˜) + β(1−D)Eι′,θ′,ψ′(Γ′ψ′)1−ρV (m′, ι′;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′)
s.t. c˜ = m+ min
a
q(a, ι;K,Z)a− q(a˜, ι;K,Z)a˜
m′ =
a˜
ψ′Γ′
+ y′ −min
a
q(a, ι′;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′)a.
5. Using the resulting policy functions, and the proxy distribution D(K,Z), compute
capital at the beginning of next period.
6. Check if it equals the guess for K ′(K,Z,Z ′).
Once K ′(K,Z,Z ′) is found,
1. Find V (m, ι;K ′(K,Z,Z ′ = g), Z ′ = g) and V (m, ι;K ′(K,Z,Z ′ = b), Z ′ = b).
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2. Update asset prices according to
q(a, ι;K,Z) =
1
1 + r(K,Z)
−
∑
Z′
∑
ι′
Pr(ι′, Z ′|ι, Z)
∫
θ′
∫
ψ′
Pr(d˜(m′, ι′;K ′(K,Z,Z ′), Z ′) = 1)
1 + r(K,Z)
.
3. Using these value functions solve the Bellman-equation and use this new value function
as the new iterate.
4. Check if the largest percentage difference between previous and new value functions
is smaller than 1e−6. If so stop, if not repeat.
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